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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
Firms are critical components in the success of virtually all modern tax systems. This 
dissertation uses theoretical and empirical methods to investigate firm behavioral responses to 
changes in tax law that affect firms’ substantive tax burden, their role as the government’s 
intermediary, or both. Such responses can change key tax system parameters, including the tax 
burden and government revenues through a change in compliance with the law or, in some cases, 
a change in the economic fundamentals like consumption or labor demand. 
In Chapters 1 and 3, I explore this premise in the context of consumption taxes. Chapter 2 
considers the income tax context.  
Two themes emerge from these projects. First, the nature of firms as entities in the tax 
system is changing, and these changes may affect the traditional role of firms as the locus of 
information for economic activity. Chapters 1 and 3 consider the phenomenon of “platform” 
firms, which shift income generation or consumption from traditional employers or retailers to 
individuals. Additionally, information on these taxable transactions is concentrated in the firm 
facilitating the transaction. Chapters 1 and 3 explore how this combination affords the platform 
firm significant leverage in negotiating the terms of its cooperation with local tax authorities in 
remitting taxes. In Chapter 2, I document the expansion of labor income generated outside of the 
traditional employer relationship, which also has a potentially disruptive effect as the 
government does not have the resources to intensively audit individual business deductions.  
 xii 
Second, collectively, these papers highlight the relevance of statutory features—reporting 
requirements, remittance and withholding obligations, size-based exemptions—which, 
historically, have not featured prominently in the optimal taxation or incidence literatures in 
public finance. In both Chapters 1 and 3, I find that shifting the remittance duty affects the 
absolute tax burden of consumers. In Chapter 2, I find evidence that a firm size-based exemption 
distorts the decisions of firms to locate, or at least to report their location, close to the threshold 
number of employees. These findings join those in an increasingly populated field of papers that 
recognize the importance of legal and regulatory dimensions for the design of modern tax 
systems.  
 
Chapter 1. Tax Incidence with Heterogeneous Firm Evasion: Evidence from Airbnb 
Remittance Agreements 
How does assignment of the remittance obligation affect consumption tax incidence? In 
classical tax theory, the responsibility of transferring tax revenue has no effect on which party 
bears the economic burden of a consumption tax. I explore this prediction in the context of 
agreements between city governments and a large digital platform firm that shifted the obligation 
to remit hotel taxes from independent renters to the platform firm itself. Using variation in the 
location and timing of such agreements, I identify a substantial increase in advertised tax-
inclusive rental prices—a violation of remittance invariance—but comparatively modest declines 
in completed reservations. A contemporaneous increase in hotel tax revenue collections suggests 
that the policy was an effective tax increase assessed on previously non-compliant renters. I 
explore heterogeneity in pass-through using several proxies for host price-setting sophistication. 
Pass-through of the effective tax increase was lowest among full-space, frequent renters who 
 xiii 
likely faced smaller optimization frictions relative to more amateur renters. My results indicate 
that shifting the remittance obligation to the platform increases after-tax prices and raises 
revenue, suggesting that consumers bear a greater share of the tax burden when the remittance 
obligation is shifted to a party with fewer evasion opportunities. 
 
Chapter 2. Independent Contractor or Employee? The Changing Relationship Between 
Firms and Their Workforce and Potential Consequences for the U.S. Income Tax 
The number of U.S. workers classified as independent contractors has risen dramatically 
over the last two decades. While this trend, in part, reflects technological changes in how work is 
carried out, some of the increase may also reflect firms and workers taking advantage of the legal 
ambiguity between classifications to obtain preferential tax treatment or to avoid complying with 
regulations.  To study this phenomenon, we exploit a sharp discontinuity in the marginal cost of 
hiring an employee, created by the 2010 Affordable Care Act.  We use U.S. tax returns from 
1997-2015 to link firm filings to associated employees and independent contractors. Here, we 
find preliminary evidence that firms substitute independent contractors for employees in order to 
qualify for size-based regulatory exemptions. We discuss empirical strategies to distinguish 
whether this substitution reflects re-organization in the production process (a real response) or 
misclassification (an evasion response). 
 
Chapter 3. Does the Elasticity of the Sales Tax Base Depend on Enforcement? Evidence 
from U.S. states’ Voluntary Collection Agreements 
 
 xiv 
In addition to taxpayer preferences, elasticity of taxable income has been shown to 
depend on parameters of the tax system—including the costs and expected penalty of tax evasion 
and the costs of tax avoidance.  However, less is known about how consumption elasticities 
change in response to enforcement. The theory of statutory neutrality predicts that structuring as 
a ‘use tax’—where the consumer remits—or, as a ‘sales tax’—under which the retailer remits—
should have no effect on the fundamental parameters of the tax system. We test this in the 
context of U.S. state restructuring of the remittance regime governing online sales shipped to 
state residents. Using detailed purchase data from the Nielsen Consumer Panel and monthly, zip-
code level information on local sales tax rates, we find that consumers reduce their online 
expenditure in response to Voluntary Collection Agreements (VCA).  However, we do not find 
evidence of a large change in elasticity of the tax base with respect to tax changes. We conclude 
that shifting the remittance duty to the party with fewer evasion opportunities, akin to an 
enforcement increase, could affect the responsiveness of the tax base to future tax rate changes, 
but that the effect of the enforcement on online retailers is too small to measure.    
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
 
Tax Incidence with Heterogeneous Firm Evasion:  
Evidence from Airbnb Remittance Agreements  
 
 
 
 
 
How does assignment of the remittance obligation affect consumption tax incidence? In classical 
tax theory, the responsibility of transferring tax revenue has no effect on which party bears the 
economic burden of a consumption tax. I explore this prediction in the context of agreements 
between city governments and a large digital platform firm that shifted the obligation to remit 
hotel taxes from independent renters to the platform firm itself. Using variation in the location 
and timing of such agreements, I identify a substantial increase in advertised tax-inclusive rental 
prices-a violation of remittance invariance-but comparatively modest declines in completed 
reservations. A contemporaneous increase in hotel tax revenue collections suggests that the 
policy was an effective tax increase, assessed on previously non-compliant renters. I explore 
heterogeneity in pass-through using several proxies for host price-setting sophistication. Pass-
through of the effective tax increase was lowest among full-space, frequent renters who likely 
                                                
 Thanks to Joel Slemrod, Jim Hines, Charlie Brown, and J.J. Prescott for their consistent support and feedback. I also 
thank Max Kapustin, Sarah Johnston, Yeliz Kacamak, Xiaoqing Zhou, Daniel Reck and Anne Brockmeyer. In 
addition to participants at the Michigan public finance lunch seminar, I thank participants at the following 
conferences for their feedback: Conference of Empirical Legal Studies at Duke University (Nov. 2016, Durham, 
NC); Midwestern Law and Economics Association Conference at Marquette (Nov. 2017, Milwaukee, WI); National 
Tax Association, Annual Conference on Taxation (Nov. 2016, Baltimore, MD); Conference on Business Taxation at 
Oxford University (Sep. 2016, Oxford U.K.); IIPF Annual Congress (Aug. 2016, Reno, NV); Mannheim 
University/IZA Doctoral Conference (Jun. 2016, Mannheim, Germany) 
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faced smaller optimization frictions relative to more amateur renters. My results indicate that 
shifting the remittance obligation to the platform increases after-tax prices and raises revenue, 
suggesting that consumers bear a greater share of the tax burden when the remittance obligation 
is shifted to a party with fewer evasion opportunities. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
A fundamental tenet of classical tax theory is that the economic burden of a tax is 
independent of which side of the market remits, or transfers tax monies to the government 
(Myles 1989; Weyl and Farbinger 2013). Tax incidence, so the theory goes, depends only on the 
relative demand and supply elasticities: the less elastic party bears more of the tax.  
However, recent studies have identified at least two circumstances in which who remits 
affects incidence in practice. First, who remits matters when one side of the market has access to 
differential evasion opportunities (Kopczuk 2009; Goolsbee 2012). Second, who remits matters 
when agents face optimization frictions (Chetty 2009; Finkelstein 2009). For example, a 
consumer who wholly ignores the presence of sales tax or incorrectly calculates the tax-inclusive 
price of an item will bear a larger share of a tax increase, on average, than a consumer who 
perceives the tax and performs this calculation correctly. In situations where, on average, 
consumers and suppliers face different optimization frictions, shifting the remittance duty from 
consumers to suppliers, or vice versa, will affect tax incidence. 
I extend this literature by studying a context in which both optimization frictions and 
differential evasion opportunities are likely present. In a simple model, I show how these 
characteristics separately and jointly affect equilibrium prices. To study this phenomenon 
empirically, I exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of bilateral remittance 
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agreements, called Voluntary Collection Agreements (VCAs), between Airbnb and city 
governments in the United States. These VCAs shifted the responsibility to remit hotel taxes 
from individual suppliers to the Airbnb platform itself. I conclude that which side of the market 
remits can have an economically meaningful effect on equilibrium prices, tax collections, and the 
characteristics of market entrants.  
The paper makes two contributions. First, I show that shifting the remittance duty 
substantially increased after-tax prices and that this effect likely stemmed from the elimination of 
a differential evasion opportunity available to suppliers.  Intuitively, suppliers that previously 
evaded the tax adjust their pre-tax price downward by less than the amount of the tax in response 
to the policy, passing some or all of the tax on to consumers. In contrast, suppliers that 
previously complied with the tax will respond to it by lowering their pre-tax price by the amount 
of the tax. This practice, as classical tax theory predicts will happen when switching the 
remittance obligation, leaves consumer prices unchanged. 
To identify the effect VCA adoption has on consumer prices, I employ two 
complementary estimation techniques that rely on separate identifying assumptions. First, I 
exploit variation in the timing and location—both across and within metropolitan areas—of VCA 
adoption to estimate a triple difference specification. The identifying assumption is that—prior to 
the policy—consumer prices in treated cities were moving in parallel with respect to two sets of 
controls: metropolitan areas that did not adopt VCAs and neighboring jurisdictions within 
metropolitan areas that did not adopt VCAs 
 Second, I take advantage of detailed data on the locations of listings to estimate a 
geographic regression discontinuity (RD) design, comparing those listings just within the 
municipal border of a VCA adopting city to listings just outside that border. Reassuringly, I find 
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similar estimates using both methods. On average, for each one percentage point of the local 
hotel tax rate, the price paid by consumers rises by approximately 0.9 percent. Using the same 
sources of variation in timing and location, I find that hotel tax collections increase in proportion 
to the size of the Airbnb market before the policy, which I interpret as circumstantial evidence 
that failure to remit was widespread.  
This result complements the main finding in Kopczuk, Marion, Muehlegger, and Slemrod 
(2016) which states that the economic incidence of a quantity tax on diesel fuel depends on the 
point of collection within the supply chain. As the remittance obligation moves “up” the chain 
from retailers to distributors and prime suppliers, the pass-through rate of diesel taxes to the 
retail price increases, as do tax revenues. This suggests that differential evasion opportunities 
afforded to these agents explain the relevance of a tax’s collection point.  
My second contribution is to provide evidence suggesting that the effect of VCA 
adoption may be heterogeneous with respect to suppliers’ attentiveness to the policy and the 
existence of hotel taxes. Although some suppliers may have purposely chosen not to comply 
with the tax prior to the adoption of the VCAs, other suppliers may have been unaware of the 
hotel taxes’ existence or their obligation to remit them. I therefore model supplier behavior as 
being characterized by their “attentiveness” and also allow for the possibility that inattentive 
hosts are not only less informed about the policy environment but may systematically err in their 
demand forecasts as well, a hypothesis for which I find empirical support. 
I document heterogeneity in the effect of VCA adoption on consumer prices by several 
supplier characteristics, including responsiveness to local demand shocks, experience, and 
concentration of competitors. I do this by re-estimating event study and difference-in-difference 
models while interacting the policy variable with characteristics of suppliers and their 
  5 
surroundings. For example, I find that a one percentage point increase in the correlation between 
a host’s prices and those of local hotels—a proxy for price-setting sophistication—results in a 
0.2 percent reduction on the overall increase in consumer prices following adoption of the VCA. 
One interpretation of this finding is that attention to local demand conditions and 
attention to the tax regime are related, and that, in consequence, pass-through in markets with 
inattentive, or amateur suppliers may be different than in markets with traditional firms. 
Although there are various studies which already suggest that consumers face optimization 
frictions that affect their responsiveness to changes in tax rate or tax administration (e.g., Chetty 
et. al 2010; Goldin and Homonoff 2012; Homonoff 2016; Lockwood 2017), there is 
comparatively little evidence on whether similar optimization frictions also affect suppliers. 
Relatedly, while tax incidence is traditionally exclusively determined by market-level 
factors such as the level of competition and supply and demand elasticities (see, e.g., Myles 
1989; Weyl and Fabinger 2013), there is some empirical evidence that differences in firms’ 
characteristics, such as managerial resources that affect price-setting strategies, can lead to 
variation in tax incidence within a market where some firms have market power. For example, 
small, independent firms are more likely to rely on simplified pricing rules, such as round-
number heuristics, and may not fully incorporate tax changes into price-setting behavior (Harju, 
Kosonen, and Skans 2015). My empirical findings suggest that more sophisticated hosts pass on 
less of the tax burden resulting from the elimination of evasion opportunity, lending support to 
this hypothesis. 
A caveat is warranted. Price changes provide direct evidence of the increased cost of 
maintaining consumption after the policy, and can also provide indirect insight into underlying 
market functions (Kopczuk et al. 2012; Stolper 2016). However, I proceed with caution in 
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inferring that the policy changed the tax incidence, at least incidence in the way that it is 
conventionally defined—as the ratio of reductions of total consumer and producer surplus that 
results from imposition of a tax. I interpret my results to suggest that the tax burden on guests in 
these cities rose—they are now paying higher prices for identical products. Yet, if some hosts 
were previously evading their remittance obligation, as seems likely, their absolute tax burden 
rose as well (from zero). Therefore, the policy changed the tax incidence in the sense that it 
shifted the burden of the tax from taxpayers to the suppliers and consumers, rather than the 
relative burden of the tax as shared between consumers and suppliers. 
Another limitation of my approach is that it relies in the main on data from a single 
platform firm, in a single industry. While I duly acknowledge that this inherently limits 
generalizability of my estimates, I maintain that two key features of this context expand the 
project beyond a case study: first, despite obvious difficulty in valuation, hosts have full 
autonomy in price-setting, and second, a large contingent of hosts on Airbnb are amateurs—lots 
of amateurs in the market characterizes other emerging platform or “market-maker” driven 
markets. 
For clarity, I explicitly define key terms employed throughout the paper as follows. I 
understand pass-through—distinct from incidence—as the degree to which tax exclusive prices 
adjust to shift the economic burden of the tax to non-remitting parties to the taxable transaction. 
As is standard, I express pass-through as a percentage calibrated to the total tax liability.1 I refer 
to individual suppliers, who list their property on the Airbnb as hosts, and consumers or short-
term renters as guests, in keeping with Airbnb’s nomenclature. I define an amateur (host) as a 
host who is a casual participant in the rental market—they did not secure their property interest 
                                                
1 However, I refer to pass through of the policy as if it constituted a new tax (rather than being partially constituted 
by a change in compliance costs). 
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for the purpose of short-term rental, and they lack the price setting acumen that accrues to 
professionals through intensive rental activity or centralized price-setting resources. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out a theoretical 
framework of the effects of shifting remittance duty which I use to motivate and interpret the 
empirical findings. Section 3 provides background on Airbnb rental markets and the natural 
experiment afforded by cities' VCA negotiations, while Section 4 introduces the data and 
characteristics of the sample. The next three sections explore empirical claims corresponding to 
the predictions of the model. Section 5 studies the effect of the remittance shift on tax-inclusive 
prices and collection of tax revenue. Section 6 considers supplier heterogeneity in pass-through 
and Section 7 asks whether the policy impacted market exit decisions. Section 8 summarizes the 
empirical results and discusses their implications for ongoing academic and policy dialogues 
about tax system design. Section 9 concludes. 
 
1.2 Conceptual Framework 
This section sets forth a simplified, partial equilibrium model of supplier behavior to 
develop intuition for how Airbnb’s policy of remitting hotel taxes on behalf of consumers 
changes the distribution of prices and supplier composition in equilibrium. It also offers several 
predictions for how these changes differ based on the level of pre-policy compliance (e.g., how 
many hosts were remitting taxes voluntarily) and hosts’ price setting sophistication. 
In this model, hosts differ along two dimensions: honesty and attention. Honest hosts 
remit in full any known tax obligations; dishonest hosts remit nothing, or some fraction of their 
true liability. Hosts also vary in innate attention, which affects their price setting in two ways: 
inattentive hosts are less perceptive of demand for their listing—leading to errors in price-
  8 
setting—and, in addition, are unaware of their remittance obligation, inhibiting optimal response 
when the remittance regime changes.  
Comparative static analysis yields three predictions. First, in the absence of evasion, the 
policy will not affect tax inclusive prices. Second, in the presence of evasion, more attentive 
hosts pass through less of the effective tax increase. Finally, on the extensive margin, the policy 
may induce some non-compliant hosts to exit the market. 
Like most economic models, this model makes several assumptions that are unlikely to 
hold in reality. I assume the prices of other goods do not enter explicitly into the host’s price-
setting. However, in a general equilibrium model with a representative consumer who optimizes 
with respect to all goods in the economy, this choice does not necessarily preclude other hosts' 
prices from having an indirect effect on the host's price-setting through the parameters of her 
demand function. To see this, consider a typical linear inverse demand function !" = $ − &'". If 
the relative price of the monopolist's good increases—say, because other goods that consumers 
purchase become less expensive—this will be expressed through a downward shift of the entire 
demand function (i.e., a decrease in the value of a, the demand curve intercept). Thus, changes in 
relative prices may shift the value of a, which in turn would affect the monopolist's optimal 
price. However, in my one period, partial equilibrium model, the parameter values of an 
individual host's demand function are static (i.e., the values of a and b are fixed).2 
                                                
2 What if, instead, Airbnb listings were imperfect substitutes for one another (i.e., moving from a strict monopolist to 
a model of imperfect competition)? Imagine that there are two hosts with imperfectly substitutable listings who 
differ along a single dimension: honesty. In a Nash-in-prices equilibrium, the optimal price of each listing takes the 
other listing’s price as an argument. The policy triggers a series of strategic price interactions that shift the market to 
the new equilibrium. In contrast to the monopolist set-up, the post-policy difference in price response by type is 
muted. The honest host will lower her listing price, but not by the full amount of the tax, because her optimal price is 
a function of the dishonest host's price response. The basic logic of this simplified two host model flows through to 
the current model with three types of hosts. As in the example, the price responses of the attentive-honest and 
attentive-dishonest would be attenuated. The price response of inattentive hosts will depend on the extent to which 
the inattentive host accurately perceives how the policy changes the best response function of other hosts. Either the 
inattentive host is oblivious to the price changes of other hosts, which would appear to assume the result, or the 
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A related limitation is that the guest’s decision of which listing to choose given prices 
and availability is omitted from the model. While it may be the case that demand for temporary 
lodging within a city is relatively inelastic in the short run, it is almost certainly more elastic in 
the long run. If this is the case, then the incidence of the hotel tax will be increasingly borne by 
hosts in the long run, as guests have their choice of visiting cities with and without remittance 
agreements. 
 
1.2.1 Set-up 
Each Airbnb host supplies a listing made unique by its location and amenities from those 
offered by competitors. For simplicity, each host ( is assumed to be a monopolist facing a 
downward-sloping demand '" in price !" for her listing.3 The price paid by guests is either the 
one set by the host if hosts are expected to remit () = 0), or the one set by the host plus a 
specific tax + if guests are expected to remit () = 1).4 More succinctly, guests face a price of !"- = !" + +). 
In the host’s optimization, however, what the guest is perceived to pay is a function of the 
host’s attentiveness, $" ∈ {0,1}. An attentive host ($" = 1) correctly perceives the price paid by 
                                                                                                                                                       
inattentive host perceives that her competitor’s prices have changed, and responds by lowering her listing price—
which (a) muddles the meaning of “inattentive” and (b) is not in line with the empirical finding that a sizeable 
number of hosts do not adjust at all to the policy. More generally, the strategic price interactions required for an 
imperfectly competitive setting seem incongruent with the limited experience and resources that characterize price-
setting for the average Airbnb host. 
3 Though not included here for concision, I also consider a model of host price-setting under monopolistic 
competition, where demand, '"(!", !4"), is declining  in the host’s own price 67869: < 0  and increasing in the prices 
set by all other hosts 67869<: > 0 . Assuming an equilibrium that is symmetric Nash in prices, the main results survive 
in sign, though the strategic price-setting attenuates their magnitude. My results also hold for a simpler model that 
incorporates limited strategic price-setting, in which a host’s demand is partially dependent on the average price, 
over which an individual host has negligible influence. The results of this model fall between those of monopoly and 
monopolistic competition, however they impart limited additional intuition while greatly complicating exposition. 
4 For simplicity, this model assumes a two-sided market (omitting the platform firm as a potential third party to the 
transaction). In reality, Airbnb assumes the obligation of remitting on behalf of guests. 
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guests (!" + +)), while an inattentive host ($" = 0) is both unaware that guests might be required 
to remit a tax and misestimates demand due to the inclusion of a noise term >". Therefore, hosts 
optimize with respect to a guest price of !"- = !" + +$") + 1 − $" >".  
Each host chooses a price to maximize her perceived profit: ?"@ = !" − +$" 1 − ) 1 − A" − B" '" !" + +$") + 1 − $" >" − C (1) 
where B" is an exogenous, host-specific marginal cost, and C is a uniform fixed cost. In contrast, 
a host’s actual profit is: ?" = !" − +$" 1 − ) 1 − A" − B" '" !" + +) − C (2) 
Relative to attentive hosts, the perceived profit of inattentive hosts differs in two ways 
that affect price-setting. First, as described earlier, inattentive hosts fail to account for the prices 
actually paid by guests, due to being unaware of guests’ possible remittance obligations and due 
to demand forecast error. The decision to relate hosts’ attentiveness to the tax environment and 
their ability to accurately forecast demand is intuitive: a lack of resources or experience could 
potentially explain both.  
Second, inattentive hosts are unable to evade their remittance obligations because they 
are unaware that such obligations exist. In contrast, attentive hosts are further characterized 
along an additional dimension of heterogeneity: honesty. An attentive host who is honest (A" =0) will remit the tax in full, while an attentive host who is dishonest (A" = 1) will not.5 Notice 
that this distinction is irrelevant for hosts who are inattentive to the policy ($" = 0). As a result, 
hosts can fail to comply with the tax in two ways: either through conscious non-compliance 
                                                
5 The purpose of this model is to generate comparative statics regarding price-setting and entry behavior by hosts in 
response to a change in remittance policy, rather than to predict changes in compliance behavior. As a result, 
evasion is modeled as a byproduct of hosts’ exogenously determined honesty, rather than an endogenous choice, and 
no cost to evading is included in the model (nor does it appear, from anecdotal evidence, that many hosts who failed 
to comply were detected and punished). 
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(“evasion”), or by being unwitting non-compliers. However, neither A" nor $" determines 
compliance with the tax when guests are obligated to remit () = 1).6 
 
1.2.2 Host’s Decision 
In effect, the model above describes three types of hosts: (1) attentive and honest, (2) 
attentive and dishonest, and (3) inattentive. All hosts choose an optimal price determined by a 
vector of host-specific and general parameters: !"∗ = !"∗(B", +, $", ), A", >"). Actual profit is then 
determined by the fixed and variable costs, the parameters governing the tax policy, the host’s 
attentiveness and honesty, and the quantity demanded given the true after-tax price faced by 
guests:  ?"∗ = !"∗ − +$" 1 − ) 1 − A" − B" '" !"∗ + +) − C (3) 
Prior to the policy change, profit is weakly increasing in the level of honesty: inattentive 
hosts cannot consciously evade, while attentive hosts earn rents from being dishonest (EF:∗EG: >0	if	$" = 1).7 However, the relationship between profit and attentiveness is less straightforward. 
Profits are increasing in attentiveness for hosts who are dishonest, but may be decreasing for 
compliant hosts. Recall that inattentiveness is positively correlated with a host’s tendency to 
misestimate the demand curve she faces. If the degree to which an inattentive host misperceives 
her demand is small relative to the cost of complying with her tax obligations once made aware 
of them, then being more attentive can actually lower profit.  
 
                                                
6 It is assumed that when guests are obligated to remit, they are unable to evade their obligation because Airbnb 
performs it on their behalf. 
7  Formally:  EF:∗EG: = E9:∗EG: + $"+ 1 − ) '" !"∗ + +) + (!"∗ − +$" 1 − ) 1 − A" − B") 6I:∗69:∗ E9:∗EG: , where – $"+ < E9:∗EG: <0 as monopolists shift only part of the perceived tax savings in evading to consumers. 
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1.2.3 The Policy 
In response to a shift in remittance obligation from hosts to guests () → 1), the change in 
a host’s optimal price will differ by her attentiveness and honesty. 
 
Proposition 1: If a host is attentive and honest (previously complied with the tax), then shifting 
the remittance obligation from hosts to guests has no effect on the final prices faced by guests.8  
A host who was attentive and honest ($" = 1, A" = 0) prior to the policy change will 
lower her price by the full amount of the tax, E9:∗EL = −+, after the policy change goes into effect, 
thereby ensuring that the price faced by guests remains unchanged, E9:MEL = 0. This is the classic 
result that incidence is independent of which side of the market remits a tax. 
 
Proposition 2: If a host is attentive and dishonest or inattentive (previously non-compliant with 
the tax), then shifting the remittance obligation from hosts to guests increases the final prices 
faced by guests. 
A host who was attentive and dishonest ($" = 1, A" = 1) prior to the policy change will 
decrease her price by less than the full amount of the tax, E9:∗EL > −+, after the policy change goes 
into effect, thereby raising the price faced by guests, E9:MEL > 0. Because this host was fully non-
compliant with the tax previously, the policy acts as an effective tax increase by shifting the 
remittance obligation to a side of the market that is unable to evade it. As an effective tax 
increase, the host will respond by lowering her price by an amount reflective of guests’ demand 
elasticity. 
                                                
8 This proposition depends on the market structure assumptions that I make in section 2.1: namely, that hosts are 
monopolists whose demand curves are independent of prices set by other hosts. 
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Finally, if a host was fully non-compliant with the tax previously due to being inattentive 
($" = 0), then she will be unaware of the policy change and therefore not adjust her price, E9:∗EL =0. If a host does not adjust her price downward, then the policy, which mechanically adds the 
amount of the tax at check-out for guests, will increase guest prices by the full amount of the tax, 
E9:MEL = +. Note that this is not equivalent to the incidence of the tax being fully borne by guests; 
failing to adjust her price downward will result in lost profits for the host. 
 
Proposition 3. Marginal hosts who are inattentive or dishonest will exit the market.  
Attentive and honest hosts ($" = 1, A" = 0) in the market prior to the policy change will 
remain in the market after the policy change: after adjusting their prices to reflect the change in 
remittance obligation, their profits will remain unchanged (see Proposition 1). On the other hand, 
attentive and dishonest hosts ($" = 1, A" = 1) and inattentive hosts ($" = 0), who both previously 
did not comply with the tax, will see their profit decrease from what is an effective tax increase. 
Attentive and dishonest hosts, being aware of the policy change, will reduce prices accordingly 
(see Proposition 2); in doing so, they will no longer collect evasion “rents,”9 and their profit will 
decrease: EF:∗EL = 	 E9:∗EL '" !"∗ + +) + (!"∗ − B") EIE9 N9:∗6L + + < 0, because −+ < E9:∗EL < 0 and EIE9 <0.10 Inattentive hosts are, by definition, unaware that a policy change occurred and as a result do 
not adjust their prices, implicitly passing the tax through fully to guests who reduce the quantity 
they demand and, ultimately, hosts’ profit: EF:∗EL = + !"∗ − B" EIE9 < 0, because E9:∗EL = 0. From 
                                                
9 Evasion “rents” refer to the surplus captured by hosts from knowingly failing to remit their tax obligations. In this 
context, only attentive hosts can enjoy evasion rents. For examples of this terminology, see KMMS and X. 
10 Formally: EF:∗EL = E9:∗EL + +$" 1 − A" '" !"∗ + +) + (!"∗ − B" − +$" 1 − ) 1 − A" ) EIE9 N9:∗6L + + . 
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among these hosts, some will have been only marginally profitable, and the policy change will 
cause their profits to decrease, forcing some to exit. 
 
1.3 Background 
This section provides three types of background information relevant for subsequent 
analysis. First, I describe characteristics of the emerging, platform-driven, short-term rental 
market, and Airbnb specifically. Next, I discuss a timeline of the Airbnb VCAs, which provide 
the plausibly exogenous policy variation needed for analysis. Finally, I provide details of 
Airbnb's implementation of agreements, including how and when the tax was displayed during 
booking in Airbnb's interface. 
 
1.3.1 What is Airbnb? 
Airbnb is the largest of several firms facilitating short-term, peer-to-peer residential space 
rentals through an online platform. Originally conceived as an online marketplace to connect 
couch surfers, Airbnb has experienced remarkable growth in recent years, expanding 
exponentially in popular tourism cities around the globe.11 Hosts on Airbnb create listings for 
each of their properties. Each listing includes information about the space’s characteristics, such 
as the number of beds, kitchen availability, and whether it is a private apartment or a shared 
space. Hosts can designate a listing’s availability and set its price for each calendar day. 
 
1.3.2 How are Airbnb Transactions Taxed? 
In addition to consumer safety concerns, local governments expressed frustration with 
Airbnb hosts’ avoidance of short-term rental taxes. In cities with significant tourism, the 
                                                
11 Paris is thought to have nearly 40,000 active Airbnb listings, the most of any city in the world. 
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estimated loss of occupancy tax revenue is significant. Initially, Airbnb’s position was that its 
rentals were not subject to occupancy taxes because transactions were “peer-to-peer” rather than 
commercial in nature. In May 2014, the company officially retracted this view and announced 
that it believed its hosts were responsible for paying occupancy taxes to local governments. It 
also amended its “Terms of Service” agreement to inform hosts of their obligation to research 
and comply with applicable local taxes and regulations.12  
On June 28, 2014, Airbnb announced that it had reached an agreement with the city of 
Portland, OR to collect an 11.5% occupancy tax on all reservations booked on its site, and to pay 
these taxes to the city at the end of each quarter. Crucially, the agreement explicitly prohibited 
Portland’s city government from requiring Airbnb to disclose information related to taxable 
transaction that could individually identify hosts. As part of the exchange, the Portland City 
Council agreed to pass a code revision that would legalize short-term home rentals if residents 
obtained a $180 permit and installed fire alarms. 
Between August 2014 and August 2015, similar agreements to collect and remit hotel 
sales taxes were signed with San Francisco, CA (14.5%), San Jose, CA (10%), Chicago, IL 
(4.5%), Washington, DC (14.5%), Philadelphia, PA (8.5%), Durham, NC (6%), San Diego, CA 
(10.5%), and Phoenix, AZ (3%), as well as several smaller municipalities. Typically, an 
agreement is announced two weeks before the date when Airbnb begins collecting taxes on all 
bookings in that jurisdiction. Airbnb notifies affected hosts of the policy change via email shortly 
after the announcement. 
                                                
12 Beginning May 1, 2014, Airbnb’s Terms of Service includes the following paragraph: 
YOU AS A HOST UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT YOU ARE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR 
DETERMINING (I) YOUR APPLICABLE TAX REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, AND (II) THE TAXES THAT 
SHOULD BE INCLUDED, AND FOR INCLUDING TAXES TO BE COLLECTED OR OBLIGATIONS 
RELATING TO APPLICABLE TAXES IN LISTINGS. YOU ARE ALSO SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR 
REMITTING TO THE RELEVANT AUTHORITY ANY TAXES INCLUDED OR RECEIVED BY YOU. 
AIRBNB CANNOT AND DOES NOT OFFER TAX-RELATED ADVICE TO ANY MEMBERS. 
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1.3.3 How do Taxes Appear to Airbnb Guests? 
When a guest searches for a rental on Airbnb, she is presented with a set of search results 
that includes an image, location, and tax-exclusive estimate of the nightly fee for each listing 
(Figure 1.1).13 After a guest clicks on a listing, she is shown a more detailed accounting of the 
rental cost, including Airbnb’s service fee and any occupancy tax. Figure 1.2 shows examples of 
listings from two jurisdictions: one that has a bilateral agreement with Airbnb (Chicago, IL), and 
one that does not (Evanston, IL). Notice that both listings appear among same set of search 
results. Without clicking on a listing, it is not evident whether an occupancy tax applies to it. 
 
1.4 Data 
My analysis makes use of multiple datasets. Below, I describe each dataset's source and 
features, and then discuss descriptive analysis of hosts' price-setting behavior. 
 
1.4.1 Data Sources and Details of Key Variables 
To measure the response of hosts to Airbnb’s remittance agreements, I collect 
information on listings for selected U.S. cities and their surrounding areas between December 
2014 and August 30, 2016.14 My data collection focused on cities with large tourisms sectors and 
cities who had announced, but not yet implemented, occupancy tax remittance agreements with 
Airbnb. In total, 20 cities enactment agreements during the period of data collection. See Table 
                                                
13 The price shown in the search results is the average cost per night of the room, excluding taxes and Airbnb’s 
service fee. For example, if a listing’s rental prices for Friday, Saturday, and Sunday are $90, $100, and $110, 
respectively, and the listing has a $30 cleaning fee, then the price displayed in the search results will be $110 
(90+100+110+30 / 3 = 110). 
14 These data are collected using an automated script or “crawler” that systematically browses Airbnb.com and 
collects information on listings associated with a particular geographic search term (e.g., “New York, NY”). The 
script mimics the browsing experience of a potential guest by clicking through each listing in the search results and 
obtaining its characteristics. 
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1.1 for a list of enactment dates. I also collect data for five cities that do not enact agreements 
during the period—these cities serve as controls. In addition to listings within the city itself, I 
collect data on listings in metro areas (MSAs) to which the implementing cities belong. For each 
listing, I obtain its approximate geographic coordinates,15 price, unit type (e.g., shared, private 
room, entire home), number of reviews, and whether it can be booked instantly. Listings and 
hosts are each identified by a unique ID, facilitating the tracking of listings over time. 
Data are collected in multiple waves, based on the implementation dates of remittance 
agreements. To supplement these collection efforts, I purchased additional listing data from 
Airdna, a company that collects Airbnb listing data. My final analysis sample includes all listings 
in the city and greater metro areas16 for all cities in the study between Dec. 2014 and Aug. 2016. 
 When a guest searches for listings in a given location, Airbnb’s site returns information 
on the price and neighborhood of up to 18 listings per page. By clicking on a listing, the user 
gains additional information about its amenities, reviews, and availability. Availability is 
displayed using a calendar that the host controls, and where days can be designated as either 
available for booking or not. If designated available, the default price for that day is the listing 
price. However, hosts have the option of overriding the listing price for a particular day, such as 
for a major sporting event. In the analysis that follows, I distinguish between the ‘listing price’ 
and the ‘booking price.’ The latter is the final consumer price, equal to the listing price plus the 
Airbnb service fee, the cleaning fee, and the tax if an agreement is in place. Consumers review 
the booking price before the transaction is completed.  
                                                
15 Geographic coordinates are purposefully offset by a small distance from the street address registered by the host 
for privacy. Once a listing is booked, the guest is sent an email with the exact street address. Anecdotal evidence, 
based on discussions by hosts on internet forums, suggests that these offsets are small (less than 1/8 mile) and, 
importantly, according to Airbnb’s website, offsets are done within neighborhoods.  
16 Listings are included based on the intersection of approximate longitude and latitude coordinates and the U.S. 
Census MSA boundary files. 
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1.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.2 contains descriptive statistics for treatment and control cities. Col. 1 provides 
the number of unique listings in the entire metro area (both treatment and control), while Col. 2 
contains the number of listings located within the municipal boundary. Col. 4-6 provide means of 
relevant variables for each metro.  
Treated cities differ in the number of listings observed in un-treated, neighboring 
municipalities. For example, almost one third of listings in the Washington metro area are 
located in neighboring municipalities, compared to a relatively smaller fraction of listings in the 
Chicago metro area. Washington, D.C. is perhaps uniquely well-suited for the purpose of 
comparing treated host behavior to that of untreated, nearby controls: more than a third of the 
listings returned in a search for the city were located in Arlington, VA, Falls Church, VA, or 
Bethesda, MD, three municipalities that did not sign remittance agreements with Airbnb. Visual 
evidence of this is provided in Figure 1.4, which shows the spatial distribution of listings in 
Washington, Chicago, Oakland and Los Angeles. 
Figure 1.3 displays the fraction of listings that change price at least once in three of the 
treatment cities in each week, limited to those listings appearing at least once in both the pre- and 
post-agreement periods. On average over the study period, approximately twenty percent of 
listings change price each week, while in San Diego, closer to a third of listings observed in any 
given week change prices at least once.  
Finally, Figure 1.5 displays a histogram of prices across all listings under $250 in the 
data. It is evident that hosts employ a number of heuristic pricing strategies, such as choosing 
prices in increments of $10 or $5. 
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1.5  VCA Effect on Prices and Tax Collections  
This section provides evidence on the first prediction of the model: in the absence of 
evasion, which side of the market is tasked with remitting the tax is irrelevant. To generate this 
in the context of cities adopting Airbnb VCAs, I answer two specific questions. First, what is the 
effect of shifting the hotel tax remittance duty from individual hosts to the platform firm itself on 
tax-inclusive prices? Second, does this policy affect revenue collection in a manner that is 
consistent with pre-policy evasion? I find that the policy increases both after-tax prices and the 
city’s collections of hotel tax revenue. 
 
1.5.1 What is the Effect of Shifting the Remittance Responsibility to the Firm on Consumer 
Prices?  
To identify the effect on consumer prices of VCA adoption, I employ two complementary 
estimation techniques that rely on separate identifying assumptions. First, I exploit variation in 
when and where—both across and within metropolitan areas—VCAs were adopted to estimate a 
triple difference specification, as well as its event study analogue. I further refine both of these 
specifications by allowing the magnitude of treatment to scale with the local hotel tax rate.  
Next, I leverage the substantial number of listings in my sample that are proximate to a 
municipal political border to implement a geographic regression discontinuity (RD) design. The 
validity of this design relies on the fact that, to consumers, listings within close proximity to a 
political border may otherwise be seen as close substitutes, yet those in an implementing 
jurisdiction may have sharply different tax liabilities and remittance obligations. To guard 
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against a failure of the assumptions necessary for a geographic RD design to be valid, I also 
implement a difference-in-discontinuities, or “diff-in-disc,” design. 
 
1.5.1.1 Triple Difference and Event Study Estimates 
Using data at the listing-date level, I estimate the following OLS equation on after-tax 
prices:  O"P-Q = A" + AQ + APQ + A-Q + ?R"S"TUVWPQXP + >"P-Q (4) 
where i is an individual listing in metro area m at time t. Each metro area fully contains the 
boundaries of a city, and each listing is located either within that city (S" = 1) or outside of it but 
still within the metro area (S" = 0). The coefficient of interest, ?, captures differences in the 
outcome for listings that meet three conditions: they are (1) located within a metro area that 
contains a city that adopts a VCA (“treated metro”) (R" = 1), (2) located within a city (S" = 1), 
and (3) observed after the VCA adopted by the city within the treated metro goes into effect 
(TUVWPQ = 1). Controls include fixed effects that absorb any time-invariant listing 
characteristics (A"), national time trends (AQ), metro-specific time trends (APQ), and trends 
common to listings inside or outside of cities (A-Q). 
Conceptually, this specification compares listings within the cities of treated metros to 
listings outside of those cities in the same metros, and to listings in metros that are not treated, as 
well as to themselves before treatment starts. Because the magnitude of the policy’s effect can be 
expected to vary in direct proportion to the prevailing hotel tax rate (XP), the intensity of 
treatment is allowed to vary with its dose. 
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I report estimates for this specification (4) on the log tax-inclusive price paid by 
consumers in Table 1.3 (Col 3). For example, for each one percentage point increase in the 
effective tax rate, the price paid by consumers rises by approximately 0.9 percent.  
This price increase, in addition to violating statutory irrelevance, suggests that the burden 
of increased compliance falls heavily on consumers. The effects on the advertised, pre-tax price 
(Col 1), and on reservations (Col 2), have the opposite sign, as expected, but much more modest 
one tenth of one percent decrease. I also report the results of a traditional difference-in-
differences specification, which restricts the sample to listings from treated metros. Estimates 
from the pooled diff and triple diff are appreciably similar, but diverge (in some cases, 
significantly) when estimated separately by metro. 
Figure 1.6 visually displays the coefficients17 of the analogue event study for Washington 
D.C., Chicago and San Diego. Notably, the difference in the control and treatment listings is 
negligible in the weeks preceding the policy, satisfying the parallel trends assumption. 
 
1.5.1.2 Regression Discontinuity and Difference-in-Discontinuities 
Using data at the individual listing level for all listings within two miles of a municipal 
border of a treated city, I first estimate the following parametric RD specification using OLS:  O" = YZ" + ?[\" + ]"(?^ + ?_\") +	>" (5) 
where i is an individual listing located \" miles inside the municipal border, ]" = 1 \" ≥ 0  is an 
indicator for listings within the municipal border, and Z" is a vector of time-invariant listing 
                                                
17 The estimating equation is: 
 O"P-Q = A" + AQ + APQ + A-Q + abcPQb R"PS"-XPd4[be4f + adcPQd R"PS"-XP + >"P-Q 
where cPQb  is an indicator for metro m in time period t being j periods away from the implementation of the policy. 
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characteristics. The coefficient of interest, ?^, captures differences in the outcome for listings 
just inside the municipal border relative to those just outside of it. 
Validity in this context requires that any observed and unobserved listing characteristics 
must vary smoothly across the cutoff, while the only factor changing sharply at the border is the 
tax treatment. On the one hand, Airbnb’s interface encourages consumers to treat geographic 
search areas as contiguous, showing results without being constrained to municipal boundaries. 
This would suggest that, from the consumer’s perspective, two listings close to but on opposite 
sides of a municipal border are equally attractive, and the setting is an appropriate one for an RD. 
On the other hand, local amenities and property taxes can differ sharply across neighboring 
municipalities, and these differences could manifest themselves in the quality of the housing 
stock—and the critical identification assumption fails.18 
To address this concern, I take advantage of the fact that enactment of a VCA might 
impact the magnitude of any discontinuity that predated it. Following the approach of Grembi, 
Tommaso, and Troiano (2012), I modify the RD estimating equation in (5) to measure the 
change in after-tax prices on either side of the border, before and after VCA enactment: O" = YZ" + ?[\" + ]" ?^ + ?_\" +	WQ g[\" + ]" g^ + g_\" + >" (6) 
This “diff-in-disc” specification shares much in common with (5), with the addition of an 
indicator for the post-treatment period, WQ. The coefficient of interest, g^, captures any additional 
difference in the outcome for listings just inside a municipal border (]" = 1) in the post-treatment 
period (WQ = 1). Estimates, reported in col. 3 and 4 of Table 1.4, confirm the existence of a price 
                                                
18 To empirically test whether the RD assumptions are met, I present in Table 1.4 estimates of (5) separately for a 
time period before and after policy enactment within select metropolitan areas containing treated cities. The results 
in columns 2 and 5 strongly suggest that a price discontinuity exists after the enactment of VCAs in these cities. 
However, in several cases—San Diego, Washington, D.C., and Phoenix—a discontinuity also exists before any 
VCA is enacted.  
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discontinuity.19 For most cities, this discontinuity is largest when measured one month 
immediately before and after the policy, and diminishes when that window is broadened to two 
months before and after, suggesting that the competitive pressure from cross-border listings may 
(slowly) cause hosts inside the city to lower their prices. 
Like the RD specification, the diff-in-disc specification provides a causal estimate of the 
effect of VCA enactment on outcomes for listings close to a municipal border. This estimate may 
or may not differ from that recovered by the DDD specification. For example, if the proximity of 
similar listings that are not (directly) affected by the VCA across a municipal border introduces 
additional competition that limits the degree of pass-through, then the effect of VCA enactment 
might vary with distance to the border. In that case, the diff-in-disc estimates will differ from the 
DDD estimates, which reflect the average price increase across all listings within the city. My 
estimates weakly support this intuition; for most metros, the diff-in-disc estimates are lower than 
the triple difference estimates (col. 0, repeated from Table 1.3, col. 3).  
Figure 1.9 provides visual evidence of discontinuities in after-tax prices after—and in 
some cases before—enactment of VCAs in Washington D.C., Chicago, Oakland and Los 
Angeles. The points plotted here are average residuals of after-tax price after controlling for 
listing characteristics and a linear time trend, for listings at different distances from the border. 
The left panel plots listings’ average residuals for the thirty days before the policy, overlaid with 
lines of best fit estimated separately on either side of the boundary. The right panel plots the 
same figure for the thirty days after the policy. Relative to any pre-policy discontinuity that 
                                                
19 The ten treatment jurisdictions shown are selected from the larger sample of treated cities because they have a 
sufficient mass of observations within a bandwidth around the municipal border. Each city’s border is represented as 
a polygon in GIS software and divided into 0.1-mile segments, with each pair of segments connecting at a vertex. 
This creates between 400 and 800 vertices per city, and each listing’s distance is calculated relative to its nearest 
vertex. Identifiers for vertices are included as fixed effects in (5), ensuring that listings on opposite sides of the same 
border segment are compared with one another. The regressions are estimated for both 30 and 60 days before and 
after policy implementation. 
  24 
existed, the gap in after-tax prices between listings on either side of the border increases with the 
adoption of the policy in all four cities. 
As was alluded to in the introduction, it is difficult to interpret from either set of 
estimates whether or how economic incidence was affected by this policy. My estimates show 
that the after-tax price rose significantly after remittance was reassigned, and, at least in the short 
term, there is no indication that the quality of rentals increased. Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
infer that consumer surplus declined. However, for previously non-remitting hosts, the tax 
increased their absolute tax burden (from zero) and weakly reduced demand, likely decreasing 
producer surplus. Without strong assumptions over underlying demand and supply elasticities, 
and pre-policy compliance, it is difficult to estimate the comparative reduction in surplus. 
Incidence in this context is further discussed in Section 6. 
 
1.5.2 What Effect did the Policy Have on the Municipal Hotel Market and Hotel Tax Receipts?  
In this section, I evaluate the effects of the policy on a city’s hotel market and hotel tax 
receipts, using monthly data from STR, a market research firm, and tax collection data obtained 
from municipal governments via Freedom of Information Act requests. By re-assigning the duty 
to remit hotel taxes from hosts to Airbnb, and therefore making it more difficult for hosts to 
evade the tax, the policy could be expected to have at least two effects on a city’s hotel market 
and its hotel tax receipts. First, it effectively increases the price of Airbnb listings, and may 
therefore increase demand for hotel rooms to the degree that those are seen as substitutes for 
short-term rentals. Second, even if demand for Airbnb rentals declines somewhat following the 
policy, it will likely increase a city’s hotel tax receipts as the opportunities for evasion dwindle. 
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Using monthly hotel market and hotel tax receipt data from 2010 through October 2016 
for four cities that enacted these policies and three that did not,20 I estimate the following 
difference-in-differences specification:  OPQ = AP + AQ + ?Whi$+PTUVWPQ + >PQ (7) 
where OPQ is the outcome of interest for municipality m in month t. Characteristics invariant to 
municipality or time period are captured by municipality and time fixed effects, respectively. 
The coefficient of interest, ?, captures the difference in the outcome between municipalities that 
adopted the policy and those that did not, both before and after its enactment.  
The hotel market data capture several monthly measures of a city’s hotel market: the 
occupancy rate, revenue per available room, and total revenue. The occupancy rate is the number 
of rooms sold divided by the number of available rooms, while the revenue per available room is 
the total guest revenue divided by total number of available rooms. Table 1.6 reports results from 
equation (7) for log versions of these hotel market measures. These point estimates suggest that 
the enactment of the policy had almost no effect on the occupancy rate of hotels, though it did 
increase revenue per available room by 6.4 percent and total revenue by 1.3 percent; however, 
none of these estimates are statistically distinguishable from zero. 
Table 1.6 also reports results from equation (7) for log hotel tax receipts. Enactment of 
the policy increased hotel tax receipts by 10 percent, though this estimate is only significant at 
the 10 percent threshold. 
Taken together, these estimates suggest that enactment of the policy bolstered cities’ 
hotel tax collection efforts, as evidenced by the increase in their tax receipts, but they do not 
provide conclusive evidence one way or the other on its effects on the local hotel market. 
                                                
20 Complete hotel market data (from STR) and hotel tax receipt data (from FOIA requests) were assembled for four 
cities that enacted the policy (San Diego, Palo Alto, Phoenix, Philadelphia) and three that did not (Houston, Austin, 
Dallas). 
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1.6  Heterogeneity in Pass-Through by Attention Correlates 
In this section, I explore how much of the observed heterogeneity in the price effect can 
be explained by differences among individuals in characteristics that suggest their attention to 
price-setting. Concluding from the previous section that non-compliance was pervasive before 
the policy, I interpret this as heterogeneity in pass-through of an effective tax increase. I find that 
hosts which present as "more attentive" pass-through less of the effective tax increase to 
consumers. This finding may generalize to pass-through of actual tax rate changes by inattentive 
suppliers in the absence of differential evasion opportunities.  
 
1.6.1 How Does the Effect on Prices Differ by Host Observables? 
As discussed in section 1.1, hosts differ in their approach to setting prices. For example, 
variation in price setting sophistication may cause some hosts to respond to the policy by 
changing (i.e., lowering) their listing price because they anticipate that consumers will be less 
willing to book at higher prices.21   
I test for heterogeneity in price response by host characteristics that may be associated 
with price setting sophistication: time series correlation between the host’s pre-policy prices and 
the prices of hotel rooms; heuristic pricing, such as setting a price divisible by 5 or 10; and 
proxies for the intensity of rental activity, such as enabling the “instant booking” feature, listing 
multiple properties on Airbnb, or listing an entire unit (as opposed to a private room in what is 
likely an owner-occupied dwelling). For each binary host characteristic Z", I estimate the 
following triple-difference specification: 
                                                
21 Assuming the listing price before the policy was optimal, and demand is not perfectly inelastic, the optimal listing 
price after the policy is lower. 
  27 
O"P-Q = A" + AQ + APQ + A-Q + ?R"S"TUVWPQXPZ" + >"P-Q (8) 
The coefficient ? represents the average percent difference in tax-inclusive listing prices for 
hosts with characteristic Z", located within the major city (S" = 1) in a “treated” metro (R" = 1) 
after the policy is enacted (TUVWPQ = 1), for each percentage point of the hotel tax rate in that 
metro (XP). 
Table 1.5 reports results of ? estimated separately for each host characteristic. Taken in 
aggregate, hosts who are less likely to be sophisticated—who do not have instant booking turned 
on, who exhibit evidence of heuristic price-setting behavior, who do not rent out an entire unit, 
and who do not list multiple properties—usually have slightly higher tax-inclusive listing prices 
following the policy than hosts who are more likely to be sophisticated price-setters. For 
example, heuristic price-setting behavior is associated with a 0.3 or 0.4 percent higher price for 
every 1 percentage point of effective tax increase. Hosts who enable instant booking, on the 
other hand, have listing prices that are approximately 0.1 percent lower for every 1 percentage 
point of effective tax increase. 
To further explore the relationship between “attention” and pass-through, I examine how 
price setting response is related to hosts’ pre-policy price correlation with local hotel prices. In 
comparison to the previously discussed binary characteristics, this measure is continuous, and 
arguably more comprehensive than self-reported attributes like whether an entire unit is being 
rented out. To the extent that hotels and Airbnb rental properties are even imperfect substitutes, 
demand shocks to the hotel market should affect the Airbnb market as well. And there are a 
number of reasons why hotel price movements should be informative about the direction and 
magnitude of these shocks: hoteliers, particularly those affiliated or owned by large chains, likely 
set prices centrally, have extensive experience in doing so, and are pricing a largely standardized 
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product. It is therefore likely that when hotel prices rise or fall, it is due to changes in the demand 
for short-term rentals that apply to Airbnb hosts as well. 
Figure 1.8 (top panel) plots event study coefficients for hosts, estimated separately by 
whether hosts’ pre-policy price correlations with hotel prices are above or below the median 
within their metro. Hosts whose prices correlated more closely with those of hotels are also more 
likely to adjust their prices upward by less after the policy, passing through less of the tax to 
consumers, at least initially. Figure 1.8 (bottom panel) plots event study coefficients estimated 
separately for hosts at different deciles of the host-hotel price correlation distribution; here, it is 
even more apparent that the more “sophisticated” hosts, whose prices tracked more closely to 
those of hotels, pass on less of the tax in the time shortly after the policy. The subsequent 
convergence of prices may suggest that these sophisticated hosts, upon learning more 
information about the resilience of consumer demand for Airbnb rentals, bring prices up and in 
line with those of hosts who were inattentive to the policy’s impact on prices. 
 
1.7  Effect of VCA on Entry and Exit 
In addition to adjusting prices, hosts can respond to the policy on the extensive margin: 
by deciding whether and where to list their properties. Hosts whose costs exceed their listing 
price in the absence of “evasion rents” have two extensive margin responses. First, they may exit 
the market for short term rentals altogether. Second, they may continue evading the tax by listing 
on an alternative platform that does not remit tax on behalf of hosts. Similarly, some prospective 
hosts who would have entered the Airbnb market prior to the policy may choose not to in light of 
it, or may choose to enter the market through an untaxed platform. I refer to this behavior as 
“platform jumping.” To the extent that some of the tax savings are reflected in lower prices on 
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the untaxed platform, consumers will also have an incentive to search on that platform. I 
examine both extensive margin behaviors in the next two sub sections. 
 
1.7.1 Airbnb Exit 
One plausible margin of adjustment to the policy is a host’s decision to exit the Airbnb 
market. This decision can appear in the data in one of two ways. First, a host can delete her 
account, which is indicated by her listing no longer being observed after the exit date. Second, a 
host can “effectively exit” the market by no longer actively making her unit available. (Airbnb is 
set up to require that hosts actively identify dates during which their units are listed on their 
calendars as available.) To determine what length of continuous inactivity likely signals an 
effective exit, I compare the likelihood that a host exhibits subsequent activity—by making the 
unit available or having it reserved—after inactivity spells of varying. On the basis of this 
analysis, I find that after 90 or more days of inactivity, hosts have a ten percent or smaller 
likelihood of becoming active again, and therefore use 90 days as a threshold for effective exit. 
I then estimate the triple difference specification (4) where the dependent binary variable O"P-Q is equal to one if host i exited the market—either by deleting her account or effectively 
exiting— on or after time t.22 Table 1.7 reports the results. On average, the policy increased the 
likelihood of exit by one third of one percentage point (Col 1). For comparison, the likelihood 
that a host in a control city leaves the market on any given day is approximately 1.2 percent, 
implying that the policy increased the likelihood of exit by 25 percent. 
 
 
                                                
22 To perform this analysis, the listing-date analysis dataset is extended so that each listing is observed through the 
end of the data window. This means that if a host deleted her account prior to the end of the data window, new 
records are created for which the host’s listing is flagged as having exited the market. 
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1.7.2 Platform Jumping 
VRBO, Airbnb’s main competitor, is one such alternative (untaxed) platform. Platform 
jumping might be more prevalent between VRBO and Airbnb because the interfaces and 
requirements for the two sites are virtually identical.23 While creating an account for the first 
time on any platform takes a modest amount of effort (Airbnb advertises that it takes less than an 
hour), the marginal cost of creating an additional listing profile on a similar platform is likely 
even lower. 
I test for a decline in Airbnb entries and reservations (and a corresponding increase in 
VRBO entrants and bookings) by estimating the following difference-in-differences equation 
separately for each platform: OPQ = AP + AQ + ?TUVWPQ + >PQ (9) 
where the dependent variable measures entrants/bookings in metro m in month t. TUVWPQ is 
equal to one in treated metros after the VCA implementation date. The identifying assumption is 
that parallel trends in entry exist between treated and untreated metros prior to implementation of 
the policy. While I find that entry into Airbnb declines and that VRBO entries increase, both 
effects are only marginally statistically significant.24 
 
1.8  Results Summary and Discussion 
In this section, I consider the relevance of my findings to broader academic and policy 
discussions on the role that statutory features play in tax compliance, the long-term collection 
                                                
 
24 Alternative DDD specification: O9PQ = A9 + AQ + AP + A9P + A9TUVWPQ + APTUVWPQ + ?RPT9TUVWPQ + >P9Q 
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efficacy of VCAs, and the welfare and distributional consequences of taxing markets 
substantially populated by unresponsive sellers. 
In previous sections, I establish four main empirical findings: 
 
(1) Shifting the remittance duty substantially increased tax-inclusive prices. I estimate this effect 
using both a triple differences and discontinuity-in-differences approach. Pooled triple difference 
estimates indicate the policy increased tax-inclusive prices by 0.9 percent for everyone 
percentage point of tax re-assigned to the platform, though estimates by metro vary. 
(2) Shifting the remittance duty increased tax revenue collections. For every one percentage 
point re-assigned, tax revenues increase by 0.8 percent, scaled by Airbnb’s market share, though 
it is not clear what portion of this effect is driven by an increase in traditional hotel prices. 
(3) Extent to which tax-inclusive prices increased correlated with attention. I estimate the triple 
difference specification interacted with host characteristics likely associated with attention to 
price setting. Hosts whose prices closely correlate with traditional hotel prices pass on less of the 
effective tax increase. 
(4) Shifting remittance duty induces exit of less attentive hosts. I find that host entry into the 
Airbnb market drops after VCA adoption, and, further, that entry into VRBO, Airbnb’s closest 
competitor, increases after VCA adoption.   
   
1.8.1 Location of the Duty to Remit Affects Compliance with, and Incidence of, Consumption 
Tax 
I find that shifting the remittance duty from hosts to the Airbnb platform increased 
equilibrium prices by nine-tenths of a percent for each percentage point of a municipality’s hotel 
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tax rate. These findings are broadly consistent with an emerging strand of the consumption tax 
incidence literature which finds that statutory features—such as the identity of the tax remitter, 
the point of collection, or the direction of the tax change—can have first order effects on tax 
incidence.  
I also find suggestive evidence that local government hotel tax receipts rise by 10 
percent, on average, following policy enactment, lending support to the evasion channel 
hypothesis of KKMS, extended to a monopolistically competitive market structure. In other 
words, the change in tax incidence here may result, in part, from different evasion opportunities 
available to each side of the market. These different evasion opportunities mean that a tax levied 
on the demand side of the market may result in a different equilibrium outcome than a similar tax 
levied on the supply side of the market. Indeed, prior to the enactment of the policy, anecdotal 
evidence suggests very few hosts were complying with the law and remitting hotel taxes. Unlike 
textbook tax incidence examples, then, the policy may not merely shift tax incidence between the 
two sides of a market, but rather changes its overall magnitude as well. 
A significant appeal of requiring firms to assess and remit taxes, such as payroll and 
income taxes in the U.S., is that it is more cost effective to administer given the small number of 
firms relative to taxpayers. However, when there are many small “firms” each responsible for 
remitting a small fraction of total tax revenue—as is the case with individual Airbnb hosts and 
local hotel taxes—it becomes costly to monitor compliance with the tax. This situation is likely 
to grow more prevalent as technology and business practices lower the barriers to individuals 
monetizing their time or possessions; not only will many more people be subject to new tax 
obligations—stretching tax authorities thin—but they may also be unaware of them. If tax 
receipts do not keep pace with tax obligations, it will not always be clear whether sellers are 
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making a conscious decision to evade in light of a low probability of detection, or whether they 
lack information about the tax and their duty to pay it. Distinguishing between these two will be 
crucial to designing remedies to ensure greater compliance. 
 
1.8.2 Welfare and Distributional Concerns in Taxing Unresponsive Sellers 
The presence of unresponsive sellers in a market, as appears to be the case with Airbnb 
hosts, can have significant welfare consequences. The tax salience literature has shown that, 
when taxes are not salient, consumers will underreact to them (Chetty, Looney, Kroft 2009). As 
a result, the deadweight loss of imposing a sales tax is inversely proportional to how salient that 
sales tax is. Yet, in the context of Airbnb, if a host underreacts to a change in remittance 
obligation that functionally acts as an effective tax increase, she may end up passing through 100 
percent of the tax to consumers. This, in turn, can have a large effect on consumer behavior and 
result in a greater deadweight loss than if the host was aware of, and responsive to, the tax. In the 
long run, this may be mitigated by the introduction of algorithms that assist hosts in setting 
prices, but in the short run, where pricing decisions are often the result of inertia or inattention, 
this remains a real concern. 
 
1.8.3 The Promise and Peril of Government Reliance on VCAs 
 Voluntary compliance agreements (VCAs) are attractive tax collection tools for local 
governments for two reasons. First, in the U.S., most sales taxes are imposed by state and local 
governments that have limited power to compel “remote” or platform sellers to remit taxes; 
absent a federal solution, VCAs allow these governments to recoup some of this otherwise 
foregone tax revenue. Second, VCAs offer an alternative to information reporting for capacity-
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constrained states that may be unable to collect a tax even with identifying information about the 
seller.  
However, the long-term effects of VCAs remain unclear, and may be potentially 
troubling. Platforms that negotiate VCAs with local governments often do so from a position of 
considerable market strength, and as a result they can secure significant concessions. For 
example, in exchange for remitting hotel taxes as a lump sum, Airbnb’s VCAs with local 
governments do not require it to provide identifying information about hosts to the tax 
authorities. Not only does this prevent local tax authorities from recouping taxes owed on 
previous transactions from hosts directly, it also prevents them from monitoring their behavior 
on other platforms, including direct competitors to Airbnb, that have not signed VCAs. Put 
differently, VCAs can make local governments permanently dependent on the individual firm for 
significant revenues, and are signed when those firms have accrued sufficient market power to 
negotiate them on their terms. 
 
1.9  Conclusion 
In classical economic theory, the incidence of a consumption tax is exclusively 
determined by market-wide demand and supply elasticities. This paper contributes to an 
emerging empirical literature which suggests that other factors, such as assignment of the 
remittance obligation, may affect incidence in practice.    
I find that shifting the legal obligation to remit hotel taxes from small, independent hosts 
to Airbnb increases after-tax prices paid by consumers. The magnitude of this effect differs by a 
number of host characteristics related to sophistication. While several rationalizations of my 
estimates are possible, this primary result is consistent with low levels of voluntary compliance 
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among individual hosts prior to implementation of mandatory withholding, despite the existence 
of a paper trail and federal information reporting on Airbnb rental transactions. This finding has 
potentially important implications for understanding the potential revenue and distributional 
consequences of taxing non-employee service transactions facilitated by digital platforms. 
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City Tax Rate
Announcement 
Date
Implementation 
Date Metropolitan Statistical Area
Treatment 
Boulder, CO 7.5 October 1, 2016 Boulder, CO Metro Area
Chicago, IL 4.5 February 1, 2015 February 15, 2015 Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI Metro Area
Cleveland, OH 3 June 20, 2015 July 1, 2016 Cleveland-Elyria, OH Metro Area
Washington D.C. 14.5 February 1, 2015 February 15, 2015 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Metro Area
Golden, CO 7.5 November 1, 2016 Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO Metro Area
Kill Devil Hills, NC 6.75 May 23, 2015 June 1, 1915 Kill Devil Hills, NC
Jersey City, NJ 6 October 12, 2015 February 1, 2016    New York-Newark-Edison, NY-NJ-PA Metropolitan Statistical Area
Los Angeles, CA 14 July 18, 2016 August 1, 2016 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA Metro Area
Malibu, CA 12 April 20, 2015 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA Metro Area
Newark, NJ 14.5 April 12, 2016 May 1, 2016 New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA Metro Area
Oaks Island/Myrtle Beach 6.75 May 23, 2015 June 1, 2015 Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle Beach, SC Metropolitan
Oakland, CA 14 July 5, 2015 July 15, 2015 San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA Metro Area
Palo Alto, CA 14 November 30, 2014 January 1, 2015 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA Metro Area
Philadelphia, PA 8.5 July 1, 2015 July 15, 2015 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD Metro Area
Portland, OR 11.5 July 1, 2014 Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA Metro Area
Phoenix, AZ 5 July 1, 2015 July 1, 2015 Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ Metro Area
Santa Clara, CA 9.5 November 1, 2015 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA Metro Area
San Diego, CA 10.5 July 1, 2015 July 15, 2015 San Diego-Carlsbad, CA Metro Area
San Francisco, CA 16.5 August 1, 2014 October 1, 2014 San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA Metro Area
San Jose, CA 10 January 1, 2015 February 1, 2015 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA Metro Area
Control 
Austin, TX 0 NA NA Austin-Round Rock, TX Metro Area
Dallas, TX 0 NA NA Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX Metro Area
Houston, TX 0 NA NA Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX Metro Area
New Orleans, LA 0 NA NA New Orleans-Metairie, LA Metro Area
Savannah, GA 0 NA NA Savannah, GA Metro Area
Table 1.1: Airbnb Voluntary Collection Agreements
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Table 1.2: Sample Summary Statistics 
City N N N Avg. Price 
Entire 
Apt. (%)
(Metro) (City)
(Listing X 
Days)
Price 
Changes Reservations 
Treatment 
Boulder, CO 3,657 2,446 193,878 143 2.9 4.9 24.1%
Chicago, IL 21,453 18,786 682,957 139 3.6 4.6 54.0%
Cleveland, OH 4,065 1,926 128,975 467 1.8 2.4 34.3%
Washington D.C. 22,401 11,904 769,856 148 3.0 4.9 51.8%
Golden, CO 12,927 112 373,278 124 3.6 5.4 29.8%
Kill Devil Hills, NC 151,370 3,993 2,064,362 170 1.6 4.3 81.4%
Jersey City, NJ 2,967 850 125,898 207 3.3 4.5 16.6%
Los Angeles, CA 87,598 51,793 2,437,104 198 3.5 5.0 49.2%
Malibu, CA 89,913 685 510,603 711 3.5 4.1 31.7%
Newark, NJ 151,370 503 876,406 161 1.6 4.6 77.0%
Oak Island, NC 3,454 467 106,225 198 2.7 3.9 10.6%
Oakland, CA 21,669 4,815 1,849,500 178 1.8 5.2 34.4%
Palo Alto, CA 14,720 1,813 1,323,801 415 2.1 3.9 33.0%
Philadelphia, PA 17,664 13,979 1,847,512 491 1.1 2.6 35.3%
Portland, OR 10,727 7,810 437,326 123 4.0 6.2 24.0%
Phoenix, AZ 12,219 4,438 505,783 329 2.7 3.8 22.9%
Santa Clara, CA 7,696 1,729 711,486 467 2.0 3.6 33.4%
San Diego, CA 21,096 14,995 686,205 219 3.8 4.4 29.9%
San Francisco, CA 47,623 25,954 5,558,380 218 1.7 5.2 45.7%
San Jose, CA 12,907 5,211 1,056,904 454 2.0 3.6 33.3%
Control 
Austin, TX 21997 19,250 949,109 277 3.3 3.6 25.9%
Dallas, TX 7823 3,710 274,168 142 3.5 4.7 47.6%
Houston, TX 12726 8,497 409,408 239 2.8 3.0 37.1%
New Orleans, LA 10539 9,723 424,294 187 4.3 4.6 29.2%
Savannah, GA 1847 1,082 66,989 235 5.7 6.7 22.8%
Avg. No. per Month per Host
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Table 1.3: Triple Difference; Dependent Variable Log Prices  
City Log Listing Price Reservations Log Price Log Listing Price Reservations Log Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.009*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.009***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Boulder, CO 0.039*** -0.073*** 0.111*** 0.021*** -0.041*** 0.093***
(t=7.5%) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Chicago, IL -0.009*** 0.002 0.035*** -0.006*** -0.002 0.038***
(t=4.5%) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Cleveland, OH 0.032*** 0.045*** 0.062*** 0.005 0.010*** 0.035***
(t=3%) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Washington D.C. 0.001** -0.017*** 0.137*** 0.002*** -0.028*** 0.138***
(t=14.5%) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Golden, CO 0.032*** -0.074*** 0.104*** 0.031*** -0.041*** 0.103***
(t=7.5%) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
Jersey City, NJ 0.009*** -0.017*** 0.068*** 0.014*** -0.005*** 0.073***
(t=6.75%) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Kill Devil Hills, NC 0.004 0.088*** 0.069*** -0.056*** 0.034*** 0.010***
(t=6%) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Los Angeles, CA 0.002*** -0.023*** 0.133*** -0.011*** -0.023*** 0.120***
(t=14%) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Malibu, CA 0.015*** -0.005*** 0.128*** 0.001 -0.013*** 0.114***
(t=12%) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Newark, NJ -0.035*** -0.035*** 0.023*** -0.034*** -0.019*** 0.024***
(t=14.5%) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Oak Islands -0.035*** 0.016*** 0.030*** -0.094*** 0.027*** -0.028***
(t=6.75%) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Oakland, CA 0.006*** -0.030*** 0.137*** 0.002*** -0.016*** 0.133***
(t=14%) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Palo Alto, CA -0.019*** -0.008*** 0.112*** -0.036*** 0.017*** 0.095***
(t=14%) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Philadelphia, PA -0.012*** -0.030*** 0.070*** -0.005*** -0.012*** 0.077***
(t=8.5%) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Phoenix, AZ -0.070*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.028*** 0.016*** 0.021***
(t=5%) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Santa Clara, CA 0.045*** -0.096*** 0.136*** 0.037*** -0.034*** 0.127***
(t=9.5%) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
San Diego, CA -0.001 0.028*** 0.099*** -0.018*** 0.022*** 0.082***
(t=10.5%) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
San Francisco, CA 0.028*** -0.088*** 0.181*** 0.026*** -0.044*** 0.179***
(t=16.5%) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
San Jose, CA -0.017*** -0.021*** 0.078*** -0.048*** 0.006** 0.047***
(t=10%) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
All Listings Fixed Listing Composition
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Table 1.4: Regression Discontinuity Estimate on Log Price at the Municipal Border
 
City DDD* Pre Post Diff-Disc Pre Post Diff-Disc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Los Angeles, CA 0.133*** 0.005 0.099*** 0.127*** 0.012 0.095*** 0.110***
(t=14%) (0.001) (0.02) (0.02) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002)
373,888 390,840 878,352 748,978 806,280 1,768,612
San Diego, CA 0.099*** 0.051*** 0.182*** 0.099*** 0.056*** 0.177*** 0.101***
(t=10.5%) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.010) (0.00) (0.00) (0.006)
420,674 457,678 287,399 811,026 957,586 577,025
Palo Alto, CA 0.112*** 0.046 0.065*** 0.057** 0.026 0.043*** -0.003
(t=14%) (0.001) (0.03) (0.02) (0.027) (0.02) (0.01) (0.016)
12,992 29,058 42,050 25,185 60,365 85,550
San Jose, CA 0.078*** -0.008 0.090*** 0.093*** 0.008 0.101*** 0.120***
(t=10%) (0.001) (0.01) (0.01) (0.017) (0.01) (0.01) (0.010)
142,158 145,241 57,507 284,778 292,247 115,281
Santa Clara, CA 0.136*** 0.098* 0.281*** 0.105*** 0.043 0.283*** 0.097***
(t=9.5%) (0.002) (0.05) (0.04) (0.013) (0.03) (0.03) (0.007)
28,275 29,232 93,970 57,581 57,700 190,713
Oakland, CA 0.137*** 0.030 0.040 0.178*** -0.001 0.032* 0.151***
(t=14%) (0.001) (0.02) (0.02) (0.024) (0.02) (0.02) (0.015)
46,951 47,019 52,229 94,933 95,780 109,935
Chicago, IL 0.035*** 0.041 0.122*** 0.116*** 0.021 0.057* 0.131***
(t=4.5%) (0.001) (0.04) (0.04) (0.006) (0.03) (0.03) (0.003)
24,215 28,014 211,555 46,521 63,414 424,835
Washington D.C. 0.137*** -0.029*** 0.095*** 0.029** -0.027*** 0.092*** 0.033***
(t=14.5%) (0.001) (0.01) (0.01) (0.013) (0.01) (0.01) (0.008)
105,734 105,821 316,259 210,914 213,920 647,244
Phoenix, AZ -0.021*** 0.155*** 0.280*** 0.131*** 0.160*** 0.271*** 0.115***
(t = 5%) (0.001) (0.01) (0.01) (0.010) (0.01) (0.01) (0.006)
107,995 108,313 216,308 219,713 220,783 440,496
Boulder, CO 0.111*** -0.006 0.088*** 0.083*** 0.008 0.110*** 0.068***
(t=7.5%) (0.002) (0.02) (0.02) (0.022) (0.02) (0.01) (0.012)
58,638 60,755 121,829 116,746 123,779 250,440
30 Day Window 60 Day Window
Notes. RD coefficients are estimated separately for the thirty day and sixty day intervals around the policy, estimates are reported in 
columns (1), (2) and columns (4), (5) respectively. Difference and discontinuity estimates are reported in col. (3) and (6). All specifications 
include for listing characteristics and time fixed effects. To ensure that like listings are being compared, I calculate the closest border vertex 
for each listing, and include vertex fixed effects. The sample is limited to listings within two miles on either side of the municipal border. 
*Triple difference estimates from Table 1.3, col (3) have been repeated for readers' convenience.
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Dependent Variable: Log Price (1) (2) (3) (4)
Instant Book Enabled? -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Base Divisible by 10 -0.001*** 0.004*** -0.001*** 0.004***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Base Divisible by 5 -0.002*** 0.003*** -0.002*** 0.003***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Entire Apartment 0.007*** 0 0.008*** 0
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Multiple Properties 0.002*** 0 0.001*** -0.000***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Host Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes
Control Cities? No No Yes Yes
Table 1.5: Pooled Triple Difference Estimates on Log Price by Host Characteristic
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Diff-in-Diff Event Study
(1) (2)
Treat * Post* Airbnb Market Ratio 2.656*
(1.09)
Pre Month 4 -0.973
(2.32)
Pre Month 3 -2.328
(2.53)
Pre Month 2 -1.769
(2.59)
Post Month 0 0.599
(3.19)
Post Month 1 -0.498
(3.11)
Post Month 2 0.736
(3.18)
Post Month 3 0.244
(3.35)
Post Month 5 0.240
(3.43)
Post Month 6 0.892
(3.06)
Post Month 7 2.770
(3.33)
Post Month 8 1.463
(3.27)
Post Month 9 1.810
(3.39)
Post Month 10 1.717
(3.36)
Post Month 11 2.090
(3.65)
Post Month 12 3.951
(3.58)
Post Month>12 8.946***
(2.40)
N 659 659
Table 1.6: Effect of VCA on Log of Hotel Tax Revenue
Notes. Dependent variable is log of city's monthly hotel tax revenues. Treatment is defined as the 
interaction between Ever Treated City*Post* Relative Airbnb Market Size at the time of treatment. Col. 
1 reports difference and difference estimates, Col (2) reports event study estimates for the equivalent 
specification. Cities included in the sample are Palo Alto, Chicago, Washington D.C. and San Diego 
(treated); Austin, Dallas and Houston (Never treated). Standard errors are reported below coefficient 
estimates. All specifications include controls for seasonality.
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Airbnb Entry Airbnb Entry (logs)
(1) (2)
Platform* Treat* Post -120.743 -1.743
(55..68) (1.68)
N 1647 1647
Table 1.7: Effect of Policy on Entry and Exit (Difference-in-Differences)
Notes. Col.1 reports average effect of the policy on Airbnb hosts (absolute measure). 
Col. 2 reports the effect of airbnb entry in logs. Both specifications estimated with 
seasonal effects. Treatment is defined as the interaction between Platform*Ever Treated 
City*Post. Platform is equal to 1 if Platform is Airbnb. Standard errors are reported 
under coefficients.
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Figure 1.1: Airbnb Search Results 
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Figure 1.2: Airbnb Listing Details in Chicago and Evanston, IL 
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Figure 1.3. Percent of Listings with Price Changes (Weekly) 
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Figure 1.4. Spatial Distribution of Listings, Relative to City Boundaries (D.C., Los Angeles, 
Chicago, Oakland)   
Note: Red dots represent Airbnb listings, Orange dots represent VRBO listings) 
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Figure 1.4 (continued): Chicago and Oakland 
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Figure 1.5: Histogram of Listing Prices 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure displays the frequency of listings by price, for all observed listings priced under 
$250. 
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Figure 1.6. Event Study Estimates of Policy on Log of Booking Price 
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Figure 1.7. Event Study Estimates for Listings with Round Base (Divisible by 10) 
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Figure 1.8: ES on Log Price by Pre-policy Correlation with Hotel Price 
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Figure 1.9: Difference in Discontinuity Residuals 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
 
Independent Contractor or Employee? 
The Changing Relationship Between Firms and Their Workforce and Implications for the 
U.S. Income Tax 
 
 
 
 
The number of U.S. workers classified as independent contractors has risen dramatically over the 
last two decades. While this trend, in part, reflects technological changes in how work is carried 
out, some of the increase may also reflect firms and workers taking advantage of the legal 
ambiguity between classifications to obtain preferential tax treatment or to avoid complying with 
regulations. To study this phenomenon, we exploit a sharp discontinuity in the marginal cost of 
hiring an employee, created by the 2010 Affordable Care Act.  We use U.S. tax returns from 
1997-2015 to link firm filings to associated employees and independent contractors. Here, we 
find preliminary evidence that firms substitute independent contractors for employees in order to 
qualify for size-based regulatory exemptions. We discuss empirical strategies to distinguish 
whether this substitution reflects re-organization in the production process (a real response) or 
misclassification (an evasion response). 
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2.1  Introduction  
Which workers are employees, and how do firms choose? Firms purchase labor from 
individuals who can be classified as either employees or as independent contractors. Firms’ labor 
and regulatory compliance costs, and workers’ labor protections, benefits eligibility, and 
preferential tax treatment hinge on this classification. In theory, this determination is made 
according to a series of rules about the nature of the work being performed, and about the 
relationship between the firm and the worker. In practice, there is substantial legal ambiguity 
about which classification is appropriate in a given firm-worker arrangement, and enforcement is 
challenging. 
The number of workers in the U.S. who are classified as independent contractors in some 
or all of their relationships with firms is rising. Some of this increase reflects technological 
changes in how work is carried out, most notably in the “gig economy” where independent 
contractors monetize their time, vehicles, and dwellings. Some of this increase may also reflect 
firms and workers taking advantage of the legal ambiguity between classifications to obtain 
preferential tax treatment or avoid complying with regulations. 
We exploit a sharp discontinuity in the marginal cost of hiring an employee to explore 
related questions arising from the second category of motivations. First, do firms substitute 
independent contractors for employees to qualify for size-based regulatory exemptions? Does 
this substitution reflect re-organization in the production process (a real response), or 
misclassification (an evasion response)? And, second, to the extent that independent contractors 
at firms just below the threshold are more likely to be close substitutes with employees, what is 
the effect of worker status on key outcome variables, such as total compensation or reported 
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income? To answer these questions, we construct a dataset linking firms to workers of both 
classifications from administrative information contained in U.S. tax returns. 
As researchers in other contexts have noted (Schivandi and Torrini (2008); Braguinsky 
(2011); Garciano et al. (2016)), some firms respond to laws and regulations that bind once a firm 
reaches a certain size—usually defined by its number of employees—by reducing their size to 
remain under the compliance threshold. Firms have several ways of accomplishing this. One way 
is to actually reduce their size by lowering the number of employees. Another way is to 
misreport their size, particularly if the audit risk is low. But a third way that exists in the U.S. 
context is to either reclassify employees as independent contractors or otherwise substitute away 
from using workers of the former type and toward using workers of the latter type. This approach 
seems particularly attractive given the ambiguity about which classification is appropriate, the 
relatively low cost of changing classification, and the relatively high cost of compliance with 
certain laws and regulations. 
To study this question, we focus on several laws that impose “size-based” requirements 
on firms: the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Family Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA), and minimum wage laws. These laws vary in their time of enactment, the jurisdiction 
(city, state, federal) to which they apply, and the firm size threshold at which they bind. By 
exploiting this variation, we show that some firms just beyond the thresholds of these laws 
manipulate their size to avoid complying with them, and that the degree of this manipulation 
varies with the expected cost of compliance. We also show that the form this manipulation takes 
is largely not that of firms reducing their overall size—employees and independent contractors. 
Instead, firms try to limit the impact of this manipulation on their productivity, either by 
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reclassifying existing employees as independent contractors, or restructuring their operations to 
rely on independent contractors to a greater degree. 
  Ultimately, we plan to use this exogenous variation in the likelihood that a worker at a 
particular type of firm—one that is most likely to have taken steps to increase its reliance on 
independent contractors to avoid compliance—is an independent contractor to estimate the effect 
of this worker status on a variety of outcomes, including compensation and tax filing behavior.  
 
2.2 Background  
2.2.1 Worker Classification 
 The legal distinction between an employee and an independent contractor is not native to 
tax law: it originates in common law principles of vicarious liability. Consider the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, under which parties can be liable, or legally responsible, for acts of their 
agents. The underlying logic is that of incentive alignment—the doctrine extends a financial 
penalty for causing harm to the party with power to instruct and supervise the agent to ensure the 
work is done with sufficient care to avoid causing harm. In a similar vein, in the U.S. 
establishment of an employer-employee depends to a large extent to which the purchaser of 
services controls how the work is completed, such as whether or not the purchaser provides 
tools, dictates the timing of work, and to the extent to which the purchaser has financial control 
over the service provider.  
 These factors have been codified, with minor variations, into state law as a multi-factor 
balancing test that requires the arbiter to weigh the relative importance of several features of the 
relationship to determine whether the worker is an employee. This approach has been adopted by 
a number of state and federal agencies for regulatory purposes. However, enforcing the 
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distinction in this context has proved problematic: evaluating the holistic nature of the 
relationship between a worker and her firm is factually intensive and requires significant 
commitment of agency audit resources. Consider the indeterminate guidance provided by the 
IRS to potential employers in deciding whether a worker is an independent contractor: 
 
Businesses must weigh all these factors when determining whether a worker is an 
employee or independent contractor. Some factors may indicate that the worker is an 
employee, while other factors indicate that the worker is an independent contractor. There 
is no “magic” or set number of factors that “makes” the worker an employee or an 
independent contractor, and no one factor stands alone in making this determination. 
Also, factors which are relevant in one situation may not be relevant in another. 
 
Despite the cost and obvious difficulty of enforcing such a standard, several features of the tax 
code depend on worker classification. Independent contractors are entitled to claim "above the 
line" business cost deductions and are not subject to payroll or income tax withholding. In 
addition, preferential tax treatment of non-wage compensation is only available to employees. 
 
2.2.2  Firm size-based regulation 
Our design relies on laws that create a discontinuity in the cost of hiring an additional 
employee.1 There are at least two substantial size-based laws enacted in years covered by the 
CDW. First, certain provisions of the 2010 Affordable Care Act apply only to firms with more 
than 50 employees. Second, the 1993 Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) similarly mandated 
that firms with 50 or more employees provide unpaid, job-protected leave for specified family 
and medical events, raising the expected cost of hiring an additional employee above the 
																																																						
1 These laws and regulations apply differentially to firms who are below or above an arbitrary threshold number of 
employees. 
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threshold. From 1999 to 2010, several states passed “binding” family leave statutes that extend 
these benefits to smaller firms.  
One of the most significant size-based regulations in the U.S. is contained in the 
Affordable Care Act (signed in 2010 by President Obama). In one of several provisions designed 
to encourage enrollment in health insurance, the ACA’s “employer mandate” requires all large 
employers to provide essential qualifying coverage. Whether or not a firm is “large” is based on 
its full-time-equivalent (FTE) employment in the calendar year prior to the coverage year, with 
50 FTE employees triggering the mandate.  Part-time employees contribute to size in proportion 
to their hours worked.2 Employers who do not comply are subject to either a Section 4980H(a) 
penalty or a Section 4980H(b) penalty.  The employer mandate was implemented in 2014 with a 
significant employer subsidy, i.e. “transition relief.” No subsidy was provided in 2015. 
For coverage year 2017, the 4980H(a) penalty is $2,265 per full-time employee (the first 
30 full-time employees are exempt) on the payroll during the coverage year, prorated by month. 
The 4980H(b) penalty is $3,398 for each full-time employee that buys coverage on the 
exchanges, capped at $2,265 per full-time employee on the payroll during the coverage year.  
Neither penalty is deductible from the employer’s business income tax, which makes it more 
expensive than the same dollar amount paid as employee salary. In total, the prior-year hire that 
triggers the large-employer designation–i.e. that raises the number of FTEs above 50—costs as 
much as $68,987 (in addition to employee’s wage and benefits). 
 
2.3 Empirical Approach 
																																																						
2 Section 4980H(c)(2)(E) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the ACA, says that the conversion factor 
from part-time employees to full-time employees is the ratio of the former group’s monthly work hours to 120. For 
example, if February had exactly four work weeks, then every employee working 15 hours per week would count as 
one half of a full-time equivalent for the month of February. 
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This section describes our empirical approach for determining whether firms substitute 
independent contractors for employees to avoid size-based regulations; whether this substitution 
reflects a real or evasion response; and the effect of worker status on outcomes such as total 
compensation or reported income. The approach relies on being able to detect unusual bunching 
in the distribution of firm size, and on being able to link workers to firms. 
 
2.3.1  Bunching and substitution toward independent contractors 
Consider the histogram of firm size shown in Figure 2.1a(i).3 As is commonly the case, 
firm size here follows a power law distribution, shown as the overlaid dashed line. In the absence 
of any regulations that create large distortions at points along this distribution, we would expect 
to see a pattern like this in the data. 
Now consider the histogram of firm size shown in Figure 2.1a(ii). Here, a size-based 
regulation imposes a large cost to hiring the 50th employee. In response, some firms choose to 
manipulate their size in order to evade the regulation by changing their reported size to be less 
than 50 employees. This phenomenon creates excess mass just to the left of the threshold, shown 
in the figure by the light blue bars. 
There are multiple avenues for a firm to reduce its reported size to below 50 employees, 
including reducing its total workforce by firing employees, or simply by misreporting. The 
channel we focus on, however, is a substitution toward independent contractors. Using data on 
workers—both employees and independent contractors—linked to firms, we can calculate the 
																																																						
3 Firm size is measured in full-time equivalent (FTE) units, one that is commonly used in size-based laws and 
regulations. 
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share of a firm’s workforce that is comprised of independent contractors. Suppose we compute 
the average value of this metric for each firm size bin, as shown in Figure 2.1b. 
The increase in the independent contractor share of the total workforce among firms to 
the left of the threshold suggests that these firms are substituting away from employees and 
toward independent contractors as a means of evading the regulation. 
 
2.3.2  Evasion or a real response 
Without being able to observe how firms carry out this substitution, it is difficult to 
determine whether it takes the form of an evasion response like misclassification, or a real 
response like restructuring of the production process to rely on independent contractors to a 
greater degree. 
One way of disentangling these two narratives is to look for direct evidence of workers 
having their status reclassified. In other words, relying on the panel nature of the data, construct 
a measure at the worker-level that reflects whether worker i in year t is an independent contractor 
with firm f after having been an employee in year t-k. Then, use OLS to estimate: 
!"# = %&'()"#*+*,- + /01('()"#, 4)60,7 + 8"# (1) 
The first term in this expression, a polynomial of order S in firm size, captures any underlying 
relationship between firm size and the average rate at which employees are reclassified as 
independent contractors with the same firm each year. The second term in this expression 
includes a series of indicators for whether firm f’s size falls within the bin denoted by g.  
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Let g = 0 denote the bin immediately to the left of the threshold. As the bin where firms appear 
to be bunching the most and where the independent contractor share is highest, we estimate 
equation (1) and test whether /7 > 0; that is, whether that bin has a higher-than-expected share 
of employees who are reclassified. If so, this provides suggestive evidence that some firms in 
this section of the size distribution arrived there by misclassifying their former employees as 
independent contractors. 
Another way to help distinguish these two narratives is to examine whether firm 
productivity varies significantly in the neighborhood around the firm size threshold. If firms are 
merely reclassifying workers without substantively changing their behavior, then productivity—
as measured, for example, by revenue—should not be adversely affected by the policy. On the 
other hand, if firms are making substantive changes to their production process, then this should 
cause a reduction in productivity relative to the optimum in the absence of any size-based 
regulation. 
 
2.3.3 Effect of worker status 
Conditional on obtaining evidence that firms manipulate their reported size by 
reclassifying employees as independent contractors, we can use the variation in worker status 
that this creates to estimate the effect of status on worker outcomes of interest. 
Let ;<"# be an indicator for whether worker i in year t is an independent contractor with 
firm f. Then, use OLS to estimate with worker-level data: 
;<"# = =-><# + %&'()"#*+*,- + /01('()"#, 4)60,7 + 8<"# (2) 
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As in equation (1), we are interested in whether /7 > 0, or whether a worker at a firm in 
that bin has a higher-than-expected likelihood of having independent contractor status. If this 
proves to be the case, we can then estimate equation (3) using two-stage least squares: 
To interpret =? as the causal effect of independent contractor status on !, we must first 
explicitly state and justify the underlying assumption. As an example, suppose the size-based law 
in question is the ACA, which mandated that employers with over 50 FTE employees offer them 
health insurance. If firms close to the 50-employee threshold respond to the ACA by shifting 
below it and rely on reclassification to do so, then it is plausible that /7 > 0 in equation (2). 
The primary assumption needed to justify the use of the bin indicator as an instrumental 
variable is that it only affects our outcomes of interest through its effect on ;<"#, a worker’s 
status. Put differently, among workers at firms in this bin, the variation in their status needs to be 
unrelated to these outcomes. Because we believe that firms, rather than workers, motivated these 
status changes, this seems plausible. Of course, it may be the case that worker outcomes may be 
correlated with working for the type of firm that would engage in such manipulation; to mitigate 
this, the vector of worker characteristics, ><#, can also include the industry in which they are 
employed. 
The empirical design in equations (2) and (3) can be further strengthened by leveraging 
the panel aspects of the data, as well as information on compliance with the law or regulation 
prior to the enactment of a size-based threshold. For example, consider equations (2’) and (3’): 
 
!<"# = =-><# + %&'()"#*+*,- + /01('()"#, 4)60,- + =?;@"# + 8<"# (3) 
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;<"# = =-><# + %&'()"#*+*,- + A# + =?(" + =B("CDE(# + 1('()"#, 4)60,7 [/0-+ /0? CDE(# + /0B (" + /0G ("CDE(#] + 8<"# (2’) 
 !<"# = =-><# + %&'()"#*+*,- + A# + =?(" + =B("CDE(#+ 1('()"#, 4)60,7 /0- + /0? CDE(# + /0B ("+ /0(G)1('()"#, 4)60,- ("CDE(# + =G;@"# + 8<"# 
(3’) 
 
The indicator (" captures whether firm f was non-compliant with the policy prior to its 
implementation. Now, the exogenous variation used to identify changes in contractor status 
comes from comparing workers in the bin immediately to the left of the threshold, for firms not 
previously in compliance (for whom the policy has the most “bite”), and in the periods after the 
policy took effect, to other workers. 
 
2.4  Data 
To conduct the analysis, we construct a dataset using the universe of digitized tax filings 
in the U.S. for tax years 1997-2015. We link individual income tax returns with information 
reports,4 and link individuals to their employing firms. This new panel dataset allows us to observe 
traditional employees and contractors working for the same firm, linked with employment and 
compensation characteristics of the employing firm. Additionally, we use combinations of 
characteristics derived from income tax returns and information reports to define what constitutes 
																																																						
4 In particular, we use income tax reports Form 1040, Schedule C and Schedule SE, and information reports W-2, 
1099-MISC and 1099-K. 
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independent contractor labor for this paper. Following the work of Knittle et al. (2011), we use 
restrictions on the type and amount of expenses reported to differentiate small businesses from 
independent contractors. Other criteria, such as the number of firms from which an individual 
receives a 1099 and the share of individual income coming from 1099s, are used to create 
consistent definitions of independent contractors relative to other types of self-employment labor.  
We expand on previous methods of identifying independent contractors in administrative 
data by including incorporated independent contractors (single owner LLCs) and test whether the 
trends we identify are consistent under more(less) inclusive criteria.  
There are several notable advantages to using tax return data to study questions related to 
independent contractors. First, and most importantly, it is possible to link independent 
contractors to all firms that compensate them. Unlike census-based linked employer-employee 
datasets such as the LBD, which are aggregated from state unemployment insurance records, tax 
return data allows us to identify all individuals that a firm compensates for labor services through 
annual (mandatory) firm information reporting to the IRS. Employees are issued form W-2, 
while independent contractors are issued Form1099-MISC or, in some cases, Form 1099-K.   
Second, we can link workers to their individual income tax returns (Form 1040). Making 
this link allows us to observe information relevant to the nature of the firm-worker relationship, 
such as the degree to which the worker relies on income from the firm, the length of time a 
worker has been associated with a specific firm, and whether or not the same worker has 
switched classification while working for the firm. Form 1040 also contains various outcome 
variables of interest: detailed information on deduction taking, total reported income, and some 
information on non-wage compensation.  
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Finally, we can access a rich set of firm characteristics by linking employing firms to 
their business income returns and other filings. These forms include information on firm 
deductions for employee benefits, which we use to identify the subset of firms that were unlikely 
affected by the regulation because they were already providing the benefit. It also provides 
variables other than labor input which should vary smoothly with the number of employees, such 
as total investment or revenue per employee. 
There are also some important draw-backs to these data. We are unable to observe hours 
worked, which makes it more difficult to directly compare compensation across workers. Also, 
for regulations that are not enforced by the IRS, we do not have the exact firm size measure used 
by the regulatory agency to determine whether the firm is subject to the regulation (i.e. the 
FMLA is enforced by the Department of Labor, not the IRS).  
 
2.5  Descriptive Analysis Results 
2.5.1  Sample 
The analysis sample, a repeated cross-section, is constructed by drawing a 2 percent 
random sample from the universe of firms with at least one employee, separately during each tax 
year from 2000-2015.5 Firms are identified by their TINs, as they appear on Form W-2 (for 
employees) or Form 1099-MISC (for independent contractors). When collapsing from the 
worker-firm-year level to the firm-year level, information about the compensation distribution of 
the firm-year (e.g., median W-2 compensation, median 1099-MISC compensation) is preserved. 
 
																																																						
5 This restriction is partly for convenience: all firms with at least on employee in the cleaned SOI Databank, which is 
already linked to W-2 workers. However, as our research question explores substitution between employees and ICs, 
this limitation is also a sensible one. 
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The sample contains 2,032,732 firm-year observations, or approximately 130,000 firms per tax 
year. Firm size, as measured by the number of employees, follows a power law distribution, with 
very few large firms in the population (See Figure 2.2). As a result, within each tax year, the 
sample contains approximately 3,000 firms with over 100 employees, or 2 percent of firms. In 
the future, we will consider drawing a stratified sample with a higher sampling rate for large 
firms to attain a sufficient number of them. 
We define two broad measures of independent contractor (IC) usage by firms. Extensive 
margin IC usage is an indicator for whether a firm hired at least one IC in a given tax year. 
Intensive margin IC usage is one of several continuous measures representing the degree to 
which the firm made use of ICs in a given tax year, such as the ratio of ICs to total workers 
(employees and ICs), or the ratio of IC compensation (from 1099-MISCs) to total compensation 
(from W-2s and 1099-MISCs). 
 
2.5.2  Firms are hiring more independent contractors. 
Figure 2.3a shows the change in firms’ extensive margin IC usage by quartiles of the 
firm’s median wage.6 Extensive margin IC usage rose gradually from 2000 to 2010, and then 
increased sharply in 2011. By 2015, extensive margin IC usage rose by almost 20 percent for 
most firms, and by almost 30 percent for firms with low median wages, since 2000. The increase 
in extensive margin IC usage was also shared across firms of different size, though was highest 
in small firms with four or fewer employees (Figure 2.3b). 
 
																																																						
6 Firms are assigned to quartiles based on their median employee compensation within the tax year. Similar results 
obtain when assigning firms to quartiles based on their average, 25th percentile, 75th percentile, or 90th percentile 
employee compensation. 
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The growth in any IC usage by small and low wage firms masks the fact that larger and higher 
wage firms, which had higher levels of IC usage to begin with, grew in the intensity with which 
they used ICs. Figures 2.4a and 2.4b show analogous information but for changes in an intensive 
margin measure of IC usage: the ratio of ICs (1099-MISCs) to total workers (W-2s and 1099-
MISCs). Higher-paying firms saw their IC usage grow by over 8 percent, compared to under 4 
percent for lower-paying firms. Likewise, large firms saw their IC usage grow by over 10 
percent between 2000 and 2015. 
For both of these sets of trends, there is a distinct break after tax year 2009, presumably 
related to the recession. These trends are also likely understated, as we do not count individuals 
who received a 1099-K for labor services they provided as ICs. They are consistent with the 
pattern of individuals increasingly working as ICs found by Jackson, Looney and Ramnath in 
their OTA working paper, which also uses CDW data.  
 
2.6  Evidence of bunching in the FTE distribution 
This section provides evidence that some firms respond to the employer mandate by 
reducing their full-time employment below 50. We employ standard bunching analysis 
techniques to visually identify missing mass to the right of the threshold, possibly created by 
firms that shifted, or “bunched,” just below 50 FTE. 
 
2.6.1 Data from ACA related firm filings 
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In contrast to the 2% sample used in the descriptive analysis, this section uses the 
universe of firm tax filings for firms with fewer than 500 FTE.7 Employers mandated by the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) to provide their employees with health insurance or pay a penalty 
are called Applicable Large Employers (ALEs). An ALE is defined as an employer with an 
average of 50 or more full-time employees (FTE) in the previous tax year. In addition to 
imposing a potential penalty, the ACA also imposes specific information reporting requirements 
on ALEs. In the current tax year, ALEs must file one Form 1095-C for each employee, as well as 
a single Form 1094-C that accompanies the transmittal of the Forms 1095-C. Each Form 1095-C 
indicates whether or not the firm offered health insurance coverage to a given employee.  
Form 1094-C contains additional identifying information about the firm, including the 
number of FTE it employed in each month of the current tax year, which is used to determine its 
ALE status for the next tax year. In addition, the 1094-C reports whether the firm is part of an 
aggregated ALE group, whether it provided minimum qualifying coverage, and its number of 
employees for the purpose of assessing penalties for failure to offer coverage,8 all at the monthly 
level. Tax year 2016 was the first year in which the IRS assessed penalties for ALEs that did not 
offer mandatory coverage for all employees. 
 
2.6.2 Analysis of the firm size distribution (“Bunching results”) 
Firm size tends to follow a power law distribution, with a long right tail of large firms 
(Figure 2.2). This appears to be true both internationally (Garicano, Lelarge, van Reenen 2016) 
																																																						
7 FTE is a lower bound for total employment—all full-time or part-time employees that count towards ALE status 
are issued W-2s, but there are some W-2 workers that do not contribute to FTE (i.e., because they are qualify for the 
“transitioning” employee exemption). 
8 This number may differ from the FTE because employers are not penalized for not providing coverage to part time 
employees, or employees who work for the firm for fewer than 3 months of the tax year. 
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and in the U.S. as measured with census data. However, in the presence of size-based regulations 
(SBRs), this expected power law distribution may not hold if firm size is sufficiently elastic: in 
response to a cost or other penalty for being above a certain size, for example, some firms may 
bunch to the left of a size threshold. In this context, because only firms with 50 FTE or more are 
required to issue Forms 1095-C and 1094-C, we cannot directly observe the distribution of firms 
on either side of 50 FTE (Onji 2009). Nevertheless, we can still look for evidence of bunching in 
response to SBRs like the ACA to the right of 50 FTE.  
In Figures 2.5a and 2.5b, we plot the number of firms reporting each integer value of FTE 
from 50 and above in 2015 and 2016, excluding firms that belong to aggregate groups. If the 
power law distribution held, we would expect the number of firms to be monotonically 
decreasing from 50 FTE onward; instead, we see a non-monotonic distribution, with fewer firms 
than expected between 50 and 60 FTE. (After 60 FTE, the series appears to resume the expected 
pattern.) This non-monotonicity is more pronounced for firms that pay lower wages, and were 
less likely to already be providing health insurance coverage to their employees prior to the 
ACA, than it is for firms that pay higher wages (Figures 2.6a and 2.6b).  
 
2.6.3  Interpretation of bunching patterns 
Though suggestive, these patterns are not definitive proof of bunching by firms in 
response to the ACA or other SBRs that anchor on the 50 FTE threshold. For example, the 
mandatory reporting obligation for firms at or above 50 FTE may result in firms near this 
threshold being uncertain about whether they are required to submit Forms 1095-C and 1094-C. 
If this uncertainty is increasing the closer a firm is to the threshold, and if some of these 
uncertain firms choose not to file, then we can expect to see a pattern similar to what we observe. 
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Despite this caveat, there are several reasons to think the missing mass we observe is indeed a 
response to the ACA. First, although some other SBRs bind at the 50-employee threshold (e.g., 
FMLA, ADA), no other federal SBR use the same definition of firm size as the ACA (i.e., no 
other SBR counts employees for the purposes of the exemption in the same manner that the ACA 
counts FTE). Though there are similarities across the definitions, the incentives created by these 
other SBRs should not create a discontinuity exactly at 50 FTE. However, we see the fewest 
firms at exactly 50 FTE (e.g. Figure 2.5b). 
Second, the cost of violating these other SBRs is not expected to vary systematically with 
the cost of violating the ACA’s firm mandate. Yet if we focus on firms that were more likely to 
provide their employees with insurance coverage prior to the ACA, such as firms paying above 
median wages, we notice that bunching behavior is significantly reduced. 
In the canonical bunching papers in the public finance literature, the goal of detecting and 
measuring excess mass in the taxable income distribution is to arrive at an elasticity of taxable 
income (ETI) (see, e.g., Saez 2008; Kleeven and Waseem 2013; Chetty et al. 2012). The ETI 
estimate can then be used as a general parameter to estimate the revenue implications of any tax 
change.  
In our context, the general parameter of interest that could be estimated from the 
bunching we observe is the regulatory cost elasticity of FTE. This parameter would allow us or 
other researchers to estimate the effects of regulations (or taxes) on firm size. Estimating this 
parameter in the context of the ACA requires us to define regulatory costs. Complying with the 
ACA varies with the specific circumstances of the firm: the cost of an essential qualifying 
insurance plan in the market in which the firm is located, the number of employees who would 
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take-up the insurance if it was offered, etc. In theory, the expected penalty, based on federal 
maximums, should provide a lower bound on the regulatory cost faced by the firm: if it was less 
expensive to provide insurance than to pay the penalty, the firm would provide insurance. 
However, the penalty also varies, though we may be able to get traction on this issue in several 
ways. The maximum amount of the penalty faced by firms for each uninsured employee is set at 
a national level, without respect to the local cost of healthcare. Additionally, linking the 
information on Form 1095-C with the individual’s tax return will allow us to determine how 
many of a firm’s employees at the time of the regulation were receiving insurance through 
another member of their household.  
 
2.7  Directions for Future Analysis 
Building on the evidence described in Section 6 suggesting a potential response by firms 
to the ACA’s SBR, we are interested in whether this response takes the specific form of 
substitution between ICs and employees, either via restructuring of a firm’s operations (“real 
response”) or misclassification (“reported response”). The challenge we face is that we are 
unable to observe firms’ FTE for those firms with fewer than 50 FTE; all we can infer from the 
absence of a Form 1094-C filing is that a firm has fewer than 50 FTE. However, within this 
group, we can neither directly measure a firm’s proximity to the 50 FTE threshold, nor can we 
order firms to create a relative ranking by FTE.  
Though this is a serious limitation, we consider in this section two approaches to 
advancing the analysis of IC usage in response to the ACA’s SBR. The first method relies on 
leveraging firm characteristics that we can observe for the full distribution to predict FTE, then 
using the predicted FTE to analyze patterns in IC usage that vary with proximity to the threshold. 
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The second method limits empirical analysis to firms to the right of the threshold for whom we 
observe reported FTE. We suggest two examples of testable hypotheses that only require data for 
firms to the right of the threshold.  
 
2.7.1 Predicting FTE 
This approach uses the relationship between pre-ACA observable characteristics and 
post-ACA FTE, for firms that report FTE and are unlikely to alter their reported size in response 
to the ACA, in order to predict FTE for all firms in the absence of the ACA. This analysis will 
proceed in three phases. 
First, we will identify firms in the unaffected region of the observed FTE distribution to 
estimate the relationship with pre-ACA observable characteristics. In theory, firms located 
anywhere to the right of the 50 FTE threshold face an incentive to relocate to the left of the 
threshold. In practice, firms’ willingness to act on this hinges on their elasticity of FTE with 
respect to regulatory costs. Larger firms, for whom a real response could be highly disruptive 
and a reporting response could significantly increase audit risk, are the least likely to respond to 
the ACA by altering their reported size. In keeping with current practice, we can identify the 
unaffected region of the FTE distribution visually, and then perform a series of robustness 
checks to ensure that our prediction results are not sensitive to this choice (see, e.g., Saez 2009, 
Kleven 2016). Based on Figure 2.5a, it appears that the FTE distribution beyond approximately 
65 assumes the shape of a power law distribution that we would expect to see in the absence of 
distortionary SBRs. 
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Second, we will use machine learning (ML) methods to estimate the relationship between 
firm post-ACA FTE and pre-ACA observables for unaffected firms, and then predict FTE for all 
firms (including those who did not file a 1094-C). ML approaches, which seek to minimize out-
of-sample prediction error, are ideally suited for this type of exercise.9 Because we are concerned 
that certain contemporaneous observable firm characteristics (e.g., number of employees, ICs) 
may themselves change in response to the ACA, we estimate this relationship using only firms’ 
pre-ACA characteristics. Finally, by estimating this relationship using only firms in the 
“unaffected” region, we seek to predict the FTE that a firm would report in the absence of the 
ACA, rather than the potentially distorted FTE a firm would report in response to the ACA.10  
Finally, we will compare the IC usage of firms that have predicted FTE>50, separately by 
whether the firm did and did not file a 1094-C. The intuition underlying this comparison is that 
firms with predicted FTE>50 that did not file a 1094-C are those that, based on their pre-ACA 
observable characteristics, were predicted to exceed the reporting threshold for the 1094-C yet 
did not report, possibly by relocating below the threshold through IC and employee substitution. 
Formally, we can test this using the following specification: !< = I'()< + 1 '()< > 50 =- + =?1 No 1094-C filing + L< (4) 
where the dependent variable, !<, is a measure of firm i’s IC usage, such as the ratio of ICs to 
total workers or the ratio of IC compensation to total. The coefficient of interest, =?, represents 
																																																						
9 In general terms, most ML techniques use cross-validation, or training the model on several subsets of data and 
evaluating their performance on a complementary set, to avoid over-fitting. 
10 To appreciate the difference between these counterfactuals, one can think of FTE in the absence of the ACA as the 
number of full time equivalent employees that the firm would hire if there was no discontinuous change in 
regulatory costs anywhere in the firm size distribution. “FTE contemporaneous to the ACA,” in contrast, is the 
number of FTE that firms would report if subject to the 1094-C reporting requirements, i.e., in a world where all 
firms were required to report FTE, regardless of the number of FTE. This measure is FTE taking into account firm 
responses to relocate (by either restructuring or misclassifying). These are both separate from a third counterfactual, 
“FTE upon audit,” which would measure a firm’s “true” FTE conditional on using the appropriate classification of 
employees and ICs. 
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the difference in IC usage for firms predicted to have FTE>50 but that nevertheless did not file 
1094-C. If =? > 0, for example, then IC usage is higher for firms that did not report but were 
predicted to have FTE>50. Conditional on finding economically meaningful substitution towards 
ICs for these firms, we could potentially distinguish restructuring and misclassification by 
estimating the same specification using a productivity metric as the dependent variable (e.g., 
reported profit). If firms respond to the ACA by restructuring, their productivity should diminish, 
as otherwise that structure was available to them in the absence of the ACA. On the other hand, 
if firms simply misclassify employees, their productivity is less likely to be adversely affected. 
The primary limitation of this approach is that the relationship between observed pre-
ACA characteristics and FTE for firms in the unaffected region may differ systematically from 
that of firms at or below the threshold. However, we can try to learn about the accuracy of this 
type of out-of-sample prediction by applying it to other portions of the observed FTE 
distribution. For example, we could estimate the relationship using firms with FTE>100 and use 
it to predict FTE for firms that report values between 65 and 100.  
We have taken initial steps to try to determine if this strategy is viable. We expect that the 
number of any employees (W-2s) will be a strong predictor of the number of full-time 
employees. We begin to explore this relationship in Figures 2.7a and 2.7b, which plot these two 
values against one another in 2015 and 2016. Unfortunately, these figures show the relationship 
between these two related employment measures is quite noisy. Presumably, exploiting 
additional information from firm filings will reduce this error considerably. 
 
2.7.2  Limit analysis to firms that reported FTE above the threshold 
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A different approach is to exclude from the analysis firms that do not file a 1094-C and 
for which we are unable to observe a reported FTE. Instead, by focusing on firms that file a 
1094-C and have a reported FTE, we may still be able to uncover evidence that will allow us to 
understand the nature of firms’ response to the ACA. Specifically, we consider two hypotheses: 
First, if firms close to the threshold on the right reclassify employees as ICs in order to 
move to the left, then the firms that remain on the right and file a 1094-C should be 
disproportionately those that have a lower elasticity of FTE with respect to regulatory costs. One 
reason why they may have a low elasticity is because they are in an industry in which it is more 
difficult to reclassify employees as ICs. This suggests a testable hypothesis concerning the 
industry composition of firms immediately to the right of the threshold, and whether those 
industries are disproportionately those in which reclassification is more difficult. 
Second, given the frictions involved with firing employees, firms seeking to avoid 
complying with the ACA may instead opt to delay hiring. This strategy is likely to be more 
sensible for firms that are not growing rapidly toward a size far in excess of the threshold. As a 
result, we might expect to see higher average employment growth rates among firms 
immediately to the right of the threshold than we would otherwise, as firms that would otherwise 
have FTE>50 and be growing slowly would instead have slowed hiring to keep FTE<50. 
 
2.8 Conclusion  
Policymakers and economists are increasingly focused on the changing structure of the 
U.S. workforce, and in particular the perceived shift away from “traditional” employment 
relationships toward potentially “alternative” work arrangements, a broad category that includes 
temporary agency workers, on-call workers, contract workers, and independent contractors. 
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Recent empirical studies have documented increases in the prevalence of non-standard work 
arrangements over the last decade.11 However, there is compelling evidence that use of survey data 
to identify a worker’s legal classification is unreliable, and likely understates these trends. 
Additionally, there is much less evidence on which factors, on either the supply or demand side, 
might be behind this increase. Our paper aims to enhance our understanding of the changing 
relationship between firms and workers, and why this relationship is a critical component of the 
design of effective tax and regulatory policies (i.e. labor protections and social safety-net policies). 
We make two empirical contributions. First, we provide evidence on whether, and to 
what extent, the use of IC arrangements has increased over the last decade. We find that firms 
are indeed hiring more ICs, a pattern that we decompose into both extensive margin measures 
(firm hiring of any ICs) and intensive margin measures (extent of firm hiring of ICs). Our 
findings, derived from high quality administrative data, are broadly consistent with the increase 
in IC arrangements measured using individual surveys. 
Second, we provide the first evidence of how firms may respond to the ACA by altering 
their reported size. The employer mandate, which applies to firms with 50 or more full-time 
employees, appears to induce some firms to report having fewer than 50 FTE (by failing to file a 
1094-C): our analysis reveals a substantial “missing mass” in the distribution of firms by FTE 
just above 50 in the years 2015 and 2016. We find a larger response among firms that pay lower 
wages and were less likely to have provided their employees with insurance prior to the ACA, 
for whom the regulation likely had more bite. With additional assumptions, we can translate the 
missing mass into a more general elasticity of full-time employment to regulatory costs.  
																																																						
11 See Katz and Krueger (2016) for evidence based on survey data, and Jackson, Looney and Ramnath (2017) for 
evidence from administrative tax records. 
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Figure 2.1a. Firm size distribution without and with a size-based regulation 
 
 
 
 
    (i)      (ii) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1b. Independent contractor share of total workforce 
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Figure 2.2. U.S. Firm Size Distribution (Total Employment) in 2014 
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Figure 2.3a. Extensive margin IC use by quantile of firm median wage 
 
 
Figure 2.3b. Extensive margin IC use by number of employees 
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Figure 2.4a. Intensive IC usage by quantile of firm median wage 
 
 
Figure 2.4b. Intensive IC usage by number of employees  
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Figure 2.5a. Number of firms by FTE (2015) 
 
Figure 2.5b. Number of Firms by FTE (2016) 
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Figure 2.6a. Number of firms by FTE for firms with average wages below 25th percentile  
 (2016, No Aggregate groups). 
 
 
Figure 2.6b. Number of firms by FTE for firms with average wages above 75th percentile  
 (2016, No Aggregate groups). 
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Figure 2.7a. FTE vs. Number of W-2s (2015) 
 
 
Figure 2.7b. FTE vs. Number of W-2s (2016) 
 
  
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
Nu
m
be
r o
f W
-2
s
50 100 150 200 250 300
FTE
Year: 2015
FTE vs. Number of W-2s
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
Nu
m
be
r o
f W
-2
s
50 100 150 200 250 300
FTE
Year: 2016
FTE vs. Number of W-2s
		 87	
References 
 
Abraham, Katherine, John C. Haltiwanger, Kristin Sandusky, and James R. Spletzer. "Measuring 
the Gig Economy." Available at: www. sole-jole. org/16375. pdf (2016); URL 
http://www.sole-jole.org/16375.pdf. 
Bickley, James (2011). “Tax Gap: Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors.” 
Congressional Research Service (March 10). 
Goldschmidt, Deborah, and Johannes F. Schmieder. "The rise of domestic outsourcing and the 
evolution of the German wage structure." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132, no. 3 
(2017): 1165-1217. 
Hahn, Jinyong, Petra Todd, and Wilbert Van der Klaauw (1999). “Evaluating the Effect of an 
Antidiscrimination Law Using a Regression-Discontinuity Design.” NBER Working Paper 
7131. 
Harris, Seth D., and Alan B. Krueger. A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-
Century Work: The" Independent Worker". Hamilton Project, Brookings, 2015. 
Internal Revenue Service (1987). “Strategic Initiative on Withholding Noncompliance Study.” 
Department of the Treasury, Pub 1415-E (Rev. 10-93). 
General Accounting Office Contingent workforce: Size, characteristics, earnings, and bene ts. 
Technical Report GAO-15-168R, GAO, April 2015. URL http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
15-168R. 
Jackson, Emilie, Adam Looney, and Shanthi Ramnath. "The rise of alternative work 
arrangements: Evidence and implications for tax filing and benefit coverage." Office of Tax 
Analysis Working Paper 114 (2017). 
Katz, Lawrence F., and Alan B. Krueger. The rise and nature of alternative work arrangements 
in the United States, 1995-2015. No. w22667. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016. 
Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen. "Bunching." Annual Review of Economics 8 (2016): 435-464. 
Knittel, Mathew, Susan Nelson, Jason DeBacker, John Kitchen, James Pearce, and Richard 
Prsinzano (2011). “Methodology to Identify Small Businesses and Their Owners.”  Office of 
Tax Analysis, Department of Treasury. 
Mas, Alexandre, and Amanda Pallais. "Valuing alternative work arrangements." American 
Economic Review 107, no. 12 (2017): 3722-59. 
Onji, Kazuki (2009). “The Response of Firms to Eligibility Thresholds: Evidence from the 
Japanese Value-Added Tax.” Journal of Public Economics, 93(5-6), June, pp. 766-775. 
Schivardi, F., and Torrini, R. (2004). “Threshold Effects and Firm Size: The Case of Firing 
Costs.” CEP Discussion Papers. 
U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy (2012). “Independent 
Contractors and the Fair Labor Standards Act.” March 2 2012. 
 
 	 88 
CHAPTER III 
 
 
Does the Elasticity of the Sales Tax Base Depend on Enforcement?  
 Evidence from U.S. states’ Voluntary Collection Agreements 
 
 
In addition to taxpayer preferences, elasticity of taxable income has been shown to depend on 
parameters of the tax system—including the costs and expected penalty of tax evasion, and the 
costs of tax avoidance. However, less is known about how consumption elasticities change in 
response to enforcement. The theory of statutory neutrality predicts that structuring the as a ‘use 
tax’—where the consumer remits—or, as a sales tax—under which the retailer remits, should 
have no effect on the fundamental parameters of the tax system. We test this in the context of 
U.S. state restructuring of the remittance regime governing online sales shipped to state 
residents. Using detailed purchase data from the Nielsen Consumer Panel and monthly, zip-code 
level information on local sales tax rates, we find that consumers reduce their online expenditure 
in response to Voluntary Collection Agreements (VCA). However, we do not find evidence of a 
large change in elasticity of the tax base with respect to tax changes. We conclude that shifting 
the remittance duty to the party with fewer evasion opportunities, akin to an enforcement 
increase, could affect the responsiveness of the tax base to future tax rate changes but that the 
effect of the enforcement on online retailers is too small to measure.    
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3.1  Introduction 
In standard economic models, demand for a taxed good is solely a function of utility 
function parameters and the good’s tax inclusive price. Implicitly, this assumes that a change in 
the log of the tax-exclusive price and changes in the tax rate have identical effects on behavior. 
However, recent literature casts doubt on this equivalence; for example, if the tax is less salient 
than the tax exclusive price at the point of decision (Chetty 2009, Finkelstein 2004), or if the tax 
increase can be mitigated by avoidance or evasion behavior in a way that a price increase could 
not (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 1996).  
In the same vein, Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) argue that the elasticity of taxable income 
is not a structural parameter. Rather, response is conditional on various parameters of the tax 
system – in particular, enforcement. In this paper, we explore whether the behavioral response of 
consumers and producers to a consumption tax change similarly varies with evasion opportunity 
in the context of U.S. states’ voluntary tax collection agreements, a structural change in 
remittance assignment which substantially increased compliance with state sales taxes for online 
purchases. If consumers become less price-elastic as a result of this enforcement measure, states 
can potentially raise more revenue while lowering excess burden.  
Existing literature has established that consumers purchase online to avoid sales taxes. 
Goolsbee (2001) was the first to suggest this channel of evasion. Einav, Knoepfle, Levin and 
Sundaresan (2014) find evidence of this evasion in consumers’ online shopping response to taxes 
on the Ebay marketplace. Goolsbee, Lovenheim and Slemrod (2010) use data on state-level 
smoking rates and internet penetration from 1980 to 2005 to show that the price elasticity of 
cigarette sales rose as ability to purchase cigarettes online increased. Baker and Keung (2017) 
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show using the Nielsen data that the internet is used as a means of evading the sales tax on a 
broader set of consumption goods, not just those subject to high sales and excise taxes.  
Policies that increase online sales tax compliance are thus a natural setting to study the effect of 
enforcement on consumption elasticities. We exploit time and geographic variation in adoption 
of Voluntary Collection Agreements (VCAs) which dramatically increased online sales tax 
compliance by shifting the duty to remit from the buyer to the seller. One recent paper shows that 
the VCA agreements had a measurable impact on consumers’ shopping behavior on Amazon. 
Baugh et al (2017) show that this increase in tax on online purchases was salient to consumers, 
and that they reduced their Amazon purchases by about 9%. However, to our knowledge, this is 
the only paper to have so far examined the consequences of VCA agreements on the elasticity of 
the sales tax base. 
To understand the likely effects of VCAs on consumption elasticity, we first build a 
simple theoretical framework to predict what might happen to the elasticity of the effective tax 
base when tax-exclusive prices remain fixed and consumers choose to either purchase a 
commodity online or at a brick-and-mortar store.  
Next, we test the underlying assumptions and predictions of our framework using a large 
panel of household purchases from the Nielsen Consumer Survey.  The rich information in the 
Nielsen data, which includes unique product identifiers, allows us to observe the elasticity of 
consumers’ purchases with respect to tax changes at both online and brick-and-mortar retailers. 
We show that consumers reduce their online taxable expenditure in response to the VCA, while 
maintaining consumption of tax exempt items. We use an event-study design to test whether 
monthly online expenditure of households in states that enacted a VCA between 2010 and 2014 
decreases following the VCA adoption relative to states which do not have a VCA. In line with 
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the findings of Baugh, Ben-David and Park (2016) for online expenditure on Amazon, we find 
that expenditure at large online retailers fell in response to the VCA.  
Next, we decompose this reduction in total expenditure into a change in reported tax-
exclusive prices of online goods and a change in quantity demanded by consumers. The decrease 
in tax-exclusive expenditure online comes from consumers who continue to purchase online, but 
switch to cheaper varieties and cheaper commodities; and from consumers who simply stop 
shopping online-an extensive margin response. Households switch from purchasing the same 
products online to brick-and-mortar stores. Since online retailers typically price their goods for 
sale anywhere in the United States and the VCAs are implemented by state, it is reasonable that 
producers do not change their tax-exclusive price in response to the VCA and that any effective 
tax increase is passed through to the consumer.  
Finally, we test whether the price elasticity of purchases at brick-and-mortar stores decreases 
because of the effective tax increase on online purchases resulting from enforcement.  While 
these results are still very preliminary, we find limited evidence that enforcement significantly 
reduced the elasticity of the tax base. 
 
3.2  Context 
In this section, we discuss why states collect use taxes on online sales, and variation in 
state strategy to collect these taxes.  
Forty-five U.S. states levy sales taxes on goods purchased for consumption within their 
physical borders, and require sellers, usually retailers, in these transactions to assess and remit 
the tax. To mitigate the tax arbitrage incentive to purchase products in low tax jurisdictions, 
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states with general sales taxes often levy parallel “use taxes” on goods consumed in their states 
by their residents, but purchased outside the state or online.  
Use tax provisions require residents to declare and self-assess the value of goods 
purchased elsewhere that would have been subject to sales tax if purchased in-state, and then to 
remit the equivalent sales tax amount to the state tax authority.1  In theory, this minimizes 
revenue loss and distortion by equalizing after-tax prices. However, in practice, very few 
residents remit use taxes from either purchases made online, or those made in other states.  In 
2012, the percent of income tax returns reporting use tax (i.e. reporting tax liability on online 
purchases) ranged from 0.2 percent in Mississippi to 10 percent in Maine.2 
   
 3.2.1 Collecting Use Tax on Online Sales  
States may impose a sales or use tax on purchases made by their residents, even if the 
retailer is out of state.3 However, the state cannot legally impel the retailer to remit said tax 
unless there is a constitutionally sufficient relationship (a “nexus”) between the retailer and the 
state.4  
As internet sales have grown in volume, states have utilized a variety of strategies to 
recoup uncollected use taxes without running afoul of the constitution’s nexus provision. 
																																																								
1 States differ in their procedure for remitting use taxes. Several states require residents to report and remit use taxes 
annually, frequently via state income tax return. However, Vermont requires residents to report and remit each 
month (cite the form they use). Additionally, most states allow residents to deduct any sales tax that was paid in the 
source state, i.e. if Michigan has x% sales tax, and Michigan resident purchases a taxable item from Wisconsin and 
consumes it in Michigan, and pays a y% sales tax on her purchase, she need only pay the difference in use taxes to 
Michigan. 
2 See report published by Maine’s tax authority: <http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/usetax.pdf> 
3 The nexus requirement arises from two provisions in the U.S. Constitution: the Due Process Clause3 and the 
Interstate Commerce Clause.3 In the seminal case on this issue, Quill v. North Dakota (1992), the Supreme court 
held that a nexus exists only if the online retailer has a physical presence in the state (such as a store, office, 
warehouse or employees) or, if the retailer has purposefully solicited the state’s residents.  
4 In addition to remittance, a state cannot impose any kind of “tax duty” (such as, requiring the retailer to report sales 
information to the state tax authority. Cite CO case. 
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Broadly, state actions can be divided into two categories; legislation, which tried to expand the 
definition of nexus to (large) online retailers in a manner consistent with Quill, and voluntary 
collection agreements (VCAs), essentially contracts between a single retailer and the tax 
authority in which the retailer agreed to remit future sales tax in return for some benefit. 
Although collectively referred to in popular parlance as “Amazon Laws,” this term is a 
misnomer; in most cases, states signed VCAs with Amazon and other large retailers either before 
or in conjunction with legislation. 
Legislation, pioneered by New York and referred to as “click-through nexus,” imposes a 
duty to remit sales taxes on any retailer with in-state affiliate or associate that directs residents to 
the retailer’s website.5 This extended the duty to remit to large retailers such as Amazon or 
BackCountry, unless they dropped all affiliated sellers in the state that sold through their 
platform. In several states, Amazon initially dropped affiliates to avoid nexus (CO, NC, TN), but 
in large states with hundreds of affiliates, Amazon acknowledged nexus and began remitting. In 
our study period, three states (CA, NJ, PA and VA) passed such legislation. 
In contrast, fourteen states announced VCAs with Amazon during our study period.  In 
general terms, a VCA is a non-standard contract between a business and a state or local tax 
authority in which the business “voluntarily” agrees to assess and remit taxes going forward, 
even if not legally required to do so.  In the context of online sales, large retailers signed these 
agreements in exchange for concession by the state, such as release from back taxes, or a 
commitment by the state not to require the retailer to disclose individual buyer data.  For 
example, in July 2012, Amazon signed a VCA with the state of Texas promising to remit future 
																																																								
5 The language of the 2008 New York statute creates a rebuttable presumption of nexus “if the seller enters into an 
agreement with a resident of this state under which the resident, for a commission or other consideration, directly or 
indirectly refers potential customers, whether by a link on the Internet website or otherwise, to the seller.” N.Y. Tax 
Law  
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taxes and to increase capital investment in the state. In exchange, the Texas State Comptroller 
agreed not to pursue collection of the estimated $269 million in sales tax that Amazon had not 
collected between 2005-2009. 
Our design relies on variation in state sales tax rate, variation in VCA adoption (See 
Figure 3.1), and variation in the tax base to which the VCA applies (i.e. exemptions). Several 
states have also enacted temporary exemptions “sales tax holidays” for specific product 
categories (e.g. school supplies), which we can potentially exploit for further variation. 
Consumers differ in propensity to purchase online; Figure 3.4 shows that the ratio of total 
expenditures online to total expenditures is rising in household consumption.  
  Sales taxes in the United States are set by states and local option sales taxes at the county 
or city level supplement these standard rates. Sales tax exemptions can vary by state. In addition, 
some goods are taxed at a special discounted or higher rate. Some goods like alcohol and tobacco 
are also subject to additional excise taxes. We focus on goods taxed at the standard sales tax rate 
and exempt goods only for now, excluding items taxed at a special rate.  
 
3.3  Data  
The Nielsen Consumer Panel is a nationally and regionally representative, stratified 
longitudinal panel of between 40,000 – 60,000 households from 2004 – 2014.6 For this draft, we 
focus on the sample of households observed between 2010 and 2014, which is the period when 
most VCT agreements were signed, to keep the dataset of a manageable size. Households self-
report their purchasing behavior to Nielsen through in-home scanners for a set of “Nielsen-
tracked” products. These products include both food and non-food items purchased at any outlet, 
																																																								
6 The sample was increased from 40,000 to 60,000 in 2007.  
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including purchases made online. Households record their purchases from each shopping trip, 
which includes information on total amount spent, retailer type, payment type, value of each item 
purchased and quantity of each item purchased. Items are identified by a unique product code 
(UPC) with details on brand variation, size, multipacks etc. This detailed product and quantity 
information allows us to more accurately measure the impact of the VCA on consumer purchase 
behavior. Unlike Baugh et al., we are able to separately analyze the response of taxable and 
exempt consumption. We also decompose the expenditure response into the price and quantity 
demanded response to the VCA.  
The Nielsen-tracked product groups capture approximately 30 percent of total household 
consumption. Our estimates of consumption elasticity with respect to the tax rate therefore only 
reflects consumption elasticity of this subset of household consumption rather than total 
household consumption. Notably, Nielsen emphasizes fast-moving consumer goods over 
durables like washing machines or cars. Therefore, our price elasticity estimates are likely to be 
smaller since durables consumption is generally more elastic.   
For tax rate changes, we use data on monthly sales tax rates at the state, county, and local 
(school district, etc.) level purchased from zip2tax. Table 3.1 shows the number of sales tax rate 
changes in our data at each administrative level. Most changes over this time period occur at the 
city level (2089). Figure 3.8 shows that the distribution of tax changes before and after the VCA 
are not very different.  
We construct a measure of total tax exclusive expenditure at each household. Each 
shopping trip a household makes is assigned a retailer code and each retailer is assigned a 
“channel type”. One of the channel categories is “Online Retailer”, which allows us to 
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distinguish online shopping trips7. We construct a measure of total monthly total online 
expenditure for each household by adding the reported item-level expenditure, which are 
exclusive of tax. Similarly, we measure total online taxable expenditure and exempt expenditure 
separately by adding up item-level expenditure of items within each category.  
Our predictions about the effect of the VCA on elasticity of the tax base assumes that the 
effective tax increase due to the VCA is fully passed through to the consumer. We test the pass-
through of the VCA to the consumer directly as the effect on tax-exclusive price at the UPC-
level. We create unit-level price of each purchase as the total price after any coupons divided by 
the quantity recorded.  
Next, we turn to whether the reduction in online expenditure as a result of the VCA 
agreements, also translates to lower sensitivity of the effective tax base to sales tax changes. 
Assuming that use tax compliance prior to the VCA is zero and 100 percent afterward, we define 
the “effective tax base” as brick-and-mortar expenditure prior to the VCA and the sum of brick-
and-mortar expenditure and online expenditure after the VCA. This definition is intended to 
capture the expenditure that is likely reported to the tax authority. 
 
3.4 Illustrative Model 
In this section, we present an illustrative model of how VCA adoption affects online and 
offline consumption elasticities and the elasticity of the effective sales tax base. We first present 
an identity for tax elasticity of demand for taxable goods, and then move to the consumer’s 
problem. We conclude with three predictions that we can take to the data. 
																																																								
7 Although the identity of individual retailers is unknown, we can identify “large online retailers” through the 
volume, diversity and ubiquity of sales recorded on Nielsen. One retailer code is a generic “Other” category but we 
believe we can identify this retailer code.  
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3.4.1 Tax Elasticity of Demand for Taxable Goods 
Total demand for taxable goods, !" is the sum of demand for taxable online goods, !"# 
and taxable offline goods, !"$. So, the tax-elasticity of demand for taxable goods is:  
%",' = )!")* *!" = )!"#)* + )!"$)* *!" = %",,'!"# + %"-,'!"$!"  = %",,'. + %"-,'(1 − .) 
(1) 
Where . = 34,34, online demand for the product as a share of total demand. The smaller that . is, 
the closer tax elasticity of total demand is to tax elasticity of demand for offline products.  
. is also directly affected by the tax rate, whether the VCA is in place, the relative price of the 
good online and offline, as well as consumers’ relative preference for online and offline 
purchasing. We present a simple model below that illustrates how ., %",,', and %"-,' might 
change as a result of the VCA. 
 
3.4.2 Consumer’s Problem 
Consumers vary in their preference for online versus brick-and-mortar purchasing, which 
is represented by the parameter 56~8(. ) and affects their relative value of online versus offline 
purchases of identical goods. For example, a consumer that prefers to try on clothes before 
purchase might prefer an identical shirt in a brick and mortar store over its online equivalent: she 
would have a negative value of 56. Conversely, a consumer who values the convenient delivery 
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of online sales, perhaps because he does not own a car, would have a positive value of 56.	The 
consumer solves: 
; <#, <$, =#, =$ = 56<# + <$ > 56=# + =$ ?@> (2) 
Such that,  A"#<# + A"$<$ + AB#=# + AB$=$ = C 
 
(3) 
where <# and <$ represent composite taxable online and brick-and-mortar goods, respectively 
and =# and =$ represent composite tax-exempt online and brick-and-mortar goods, AD6  is the 
after-tax unit price of good E. This utility function reflects two key assumptions: (1) that offline 
and online versions of the taxable and exempt goods are perfect substitutes and (2) that 
consumers spend a constant share of their income on the taxable and exempt goods. The first 
should hold generally – any individual consumer probably does not purchase the same good both 
online and offline. The second is assumed for now for simplicity but may be relaxed later.  
Each unit of the online good is 56 times as valuable as the offline good. 56 > 1 would imply that 
the price of <$ must be less than ?GH times the price of <# for the consumer to prefer <$. So, in the 
first step consumers choose between the online and offline version of the goods.  
A consumer chooses I = <# if  J4,GH < A"$. They choose L = =# if   JM,GH < AB$.  
The probability that a consumer chooses <# is therefore:  
N A"#56 < A"$ = N A"#A"$ < 56 = 1 − 8 A"#A"$  (4) 
The consumer’s problem then reduces to: 
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maxR,S I>L?@> 
 T. *.		U"I + USL = C 
 
(5) 
where 
I = C A"#A"$ < 56 56<# + 1 − C A"#A"$ < 56 <$ (6) 
  
L = C AB#AB$ < 56 56=# + 1 − C AB#AB$ < 56 =$ 
 
(7) 
U" = C A"#A"$ < 56 A"# + 1 − C A"#A"$ < 56 A"$ 	
(8) 
US = C AB#AB$ < 56 AB# + 1 − C AB#AB$ < 56 AB$ 	
(9) 
  
For the tax-exempt goods, AB6 = VB6  where VB6  is the pre-tax price. Prior to the VCA, online 
sales were effectively treated as exempt, i.e. A"# = V"# ; after the VCA, they were subject to sales 
tax A"# = V"#(1 + *). For taxable goods in brick and mortar stores, A"$ = V"$(1 + *) both before 
and after the VCA. We also assume that the tax-exclusive prices are fixed and exogenously 
given, i.e. perfectly elastic supply curves, an assumption we will justify in the next section.  
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The Cobb-Douglas utility gives rise to the following individual demand functions: I U", C = >WX4 
and L US, C = (?@>)WXY . Aggregate demand for taxable online goods is therefore8:  
!"# = 1 − 8 A"#A"$ ZCA"#  
 
(10) 
Similarly, aggregate demand for taxable brick and mortar goods is:  
!"$ = 8 A"#A"$ ZCA"$  
 
(11) 
 
3.4.3  Predictions  
Comparative statics yield three testable predictions relevant to the effect of the policy on 
consumption elasticities: 
 
Proposition 1: If the VCA substantially increased sales tax compliance for online purchases, the 
tax elasticity of online taxable goods changes sign, becoming negative. 
Prior to VCA adoption, the tax elasticity of demand for taxable online goods is:  
																																																								
8 Because, 	 !"# = 	 N 	A"#56 < A"$ I U", C dF Ψ^_H  = 1 − 8 A"#A"$ ZCA"# dF Ψ^_H  = 1 − 8 A"#A"$ ZCA"#  
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%",,'`aB = )!"#)* *!"# = *1 + * V"#A"$ b V"
# A"$1 − 8 V"# A"$ > 0 
 
(12) 
This is intuitive. As the tax rate increases, making taxed brick and mortar goods comparatively 
more expensive, consumers with marginally lower values of 56	who previously purchased a 
product in a brick and mortar store will switch to purchasing online.  
After VCA adoption,  A"# = V"#(1 + *) and d J4, J4-d' = 0. 
Therefore,  
%",,'`#e' = − *1 + * < 0 
 
(13) 
After the VCA, a change in the tax rate does not change the relative price of online and offline 
products, and so it does not affect the share of online demand. The demand elasticity for online 
goods is the same as that of offline goods.  
 
Proposition 2: Tax elasticity of brick and mortar taxable goods remains negative but becomes 
smaller in magnitude. 
After the VCA,  
%"-,'`#e' = %",,'`#e' = − *1 + * > %"-,'`aB  
 
(14) 
This reflects the elasticity of demand coming from the increase in after tax price of <$ as well as 
the decrease in demand from consumers shifting from offline to online consumption. This is in 
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accord with standard models:  %"-,' is generally negative prior to the VCA since an increase in 
the local sales tax rate would induce individuals to switch to purchasing online, or to demand 
less offline.  
After the implementation of the VCA, %",,', should become negative since an increase in 
the tax rate would also increase the relative after tax price of online goods. %"-,' will become 
smaller in magnitude as individuals will no longer switch from purchasing offline to online.  
How these changes in demand elasticity for online and offline products affects overall elasticity 
will depend on the relative importance of the online and offline demand for the product as well 
as the magnitude of the change in elasticity.  
 
Proposition 3: The elasticity of the effective tax base, defined as the value of goods on which tax 
is remitted, becomes smaller in magnitude. 
We define the effective tax base as purchases reported to the tax authority (and on which 
tax is remitted). Prior to the VCA, the base is simply the offline purchases as almost no online 
purchase is reported. After the VCA we assume full compliance on both online and offline 
purchases. Therefore, the effective tax base is now both online and offline purchases.   
Post VCA the tax-elasticity of online and offline tax base is identical and the elasticity of the 
effective tax base is: 
%" ,'`#e' = − *1 + * 
 
(15) 
Prior to the VCA, the base is equal to offline expenditure and therefore the elasticity is:  
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%" ,'`aB = %"-,'`aB = − *1 + * b V"
# A"$8 V"# A"$ V"
#A"$ + 1 > %" ,'`#e' 
 
(16) 
3.5  VCA Effect on Online Prices and Consumption 
In this section, we establish several preliminary empirical facts implicitly assumed by our 
model. We find that the VCA had an effect on online purchasing by households, and that these 
effects are consistent with an after tax price increase in online goods. First, we evidence that 
VCAs substantially increased the number of online purchases on which sales taxes were 
collected by online retailers. Next, using two measures of consumer behavior, we show that 
consumers reacted to this change in remittance policy akin to a tax increase, suggesting that use 
tax compliance was low prior to VCAs. 
 
3.5.1  More Online Foods Are Taxed at Point of Sale After the VCA  
A prima facie question is “Did the Amazon Laws actually induce online retailers to 
collect and remit sales taxes?” Given the difficulty and expense state authorities face in enforcing 
remittance obligations against out of state retailers, we do not assume that VCA were efficacious. 
Instead, we establish that retailers began collecting tax on online purchases from the data. 
Nielsen records expenditure in two variables – item-level expenditure and trip-level expenditure. 
The trip-level expenditure is always tax-inclusive while the item-level is tax exclusive.9 If no 
sales tax is collected at the point of transaction, the aggregate of all item expenditures for a given 
trip will equal the trip-level expenditure. If the VCA induced retailer remittance, we expect the 
fraction of online transactions where no sales tax was collected to fall.  																																																								
9 We investigate this crucial aspect of the data in detail. See the data appendix.  
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We visually test whether this is indeed the case. After restricting the data to trips in which 
only taxable items were purchased, we separately plot the share of trips where the sum of the 
item-level expenditure equals the trip-level expenditure for online and offline purchases, relative 
to the VCA adoption (see Figure 3.2). Prior to the VCA agreements, about 25 percent of online 
trips have no tax collected, whereas only about 12 percent of offline trips have no tax collected 
(or report item-level tax-inclusive expenditures). We see a sharp drop in this fraction for online 
trips, suggesting that online retailers began collecting sales taxes soon after implementation of 
the VCA. 
Having established that online retailers remitted after the policy, we now turn to the 
consumer response. Classical tax theory, which assumes full salience and compliance, would 
predict that shifting the remittance duty from the consumer to the retailer should have no effect 
on equilibrium quantities and prices. However, if, as we suspect, compliance with use taxes was 
low, for most consumers the policy increased the tax inclusive price of online goods.10 
 
3.5.2  Consumers Reduced Total Online Spending on Taxed Goods, Though Not Tax-Exempt 
Goods 
We estimate the effect of the policy on online purchasing behavior by estimating the 
following difference in difference specification:  fgh = ij + i?kg ∗ NmT*gh + inIgh + oh + pg + qgh (17) 
where fgh is either (1) total online taxable expenditure or (2) total online exempt expenditure of 
household h in month m. i? is the parameter of interest where  kg	indicates where household h is 
																																																								
10 The exact amount that after tax prices increase depends on relative demand and supply elasticities, but, as most 
Nielsen tracked products are commodities, we think 0% pass through is unlikely. Also, NB, I haven’t actually met 
anyone in the flesh who remits use taxes. 
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in a state that adopts the VCA between 2010 and 2014 and  NmT*gh is an indicator for whether 
we are observing household h in a month m following adoption of VCA in that state. We also 
control for time fixed effects (oh) and household fixed effects (pg), as well as time-varying area-
level characteristics (Igh) such as a local cost of living index11.   
If the parallel trends assumption holds—that is, if the online purchasing habits of 
households in states that did not adopt VCAs are a suitable counterfactual for the purchasing 
habits of households in states that adopted VCAs—then this parameter represents the difference-
in-differences estimator of the effect of VCA adoption on the extensive and intensive margin of 
online sales. We would expect that online expenditure on taxable items falls as a result of the 
VCA but that online expenditure on exempt items does not change.  
We find that the introduction of the VCA reduced total monthly tax-exclusive 
expenditure online by about 20 cents on average, which represents an 8 percent decrease relative 
to the mean (Table 3.2, column 1). In contrast, we see no statistically significant effect of the 
VCA on online expenditure on exempt goods and the estimated magnitude is close to zero. These 
estimates control for household, year and month fixed effects and standard errors are clustered 
by state. Total monthly expenditure at brick and mortar stores increase by about one dollar but 
these effects are not statistically significant. Note however, that monthly expenditure at brick-
and-mortar stores also include expenditure on goods that are never purchased online even prior 
to the VCAs. It is therefore possible that expenditure on goods that were previously purchased 
online increases while there is no change in other expenditure. Figure 3.3 shows, there is no 
anticipatory effect of the VCA in the quarter before and the parallel trends assumption holds.  
																																																								
11 We create this measure following steps outlined in Baugh et al. (2017) 
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Figure 3.3 shows that online tax-exclusive expenditure on taxable goods falls in months 
following the VCA. In months before the VCA we do not see any anticipatory effects on online 
expenditure. Prior to the VCA, although we see fluctuation in expenditure from month to month, 
on average the difference in expenditure in these months relative to month just prior to the VCA 
is 0. After the VCA, we see that on average the expenditure is about 20 to 30 cents lower each 
month.  
We also separately estimate the effect of the VCA on large versus small retailers. Nielsen 
lists a unique retailer code that identifies where each purchase was made. We define “large” 
retailer as the two retailer codes that together represent about 50 percent of all online purchases. 
We find that the expenditure decline comes largely from declines at these large online retailers. 
Expenditure at these retailers declines by nearly 20 percent (Table 3.2, column 2). Expenditure at 
small retailers on the other hand shows a small but statistically insignificant increase (Table 3.2, 
column 3). Similarly, we find small and statistically insignificant increases in taxable and exempt 
expenditure at brick-and-mortar stores (Table 3.2, columns 4 and 5). 
In Figure 3.6 we see a small and possibly delayed effect on monthly online tax-exclusive 
expenditure of households on exempt goods. However, on average this is a statistically 
significant expenditure change. Again, there does not seem to be evidence of anticipatory effects 
or differential trends in online expenditure between households in states that do and do not adopt 
the VCA.  
 
3.5.3  Online Retailers Do Not Adjust Tax-Exclusive Prices; Consumers Reduce Quantity 
Purchased 
 	 107 
We decompose the change in tax-exclusive online expenditure into the change in the tax-
exclusive price of goods and change in consumer demand. Our specification estimating the effect 
on tax-exclusive prices: log	(Vuhv) = ij + i?ku ∗ NmT*uh + oh + wx + pv + Zu + qehv (18) 
where the coefficient of interest is again i?, which represents the average percent change in the 
tax-exclusive price across all products due to the VCA.  
Next, we test the effect on consumer demand (quantity purchased) within UPC using the 
following specification:  log	(Auhv) = ij + i?ku ∗ NmT*uh + oh + wx + pv + Zu + qehv (19) 
where i? is the estimate of average percent change in quantity demanded for product, conditional 
on purchase (i.e. intensive margin effect on quantity). The drawback of this specification is that a 
null effect could be consistent with a couple of different interpretations: (1) Consumers do not 
reduce their quantity demanded on most goods, conditional on online purchase, as a result of the 
VCA, (2) Consumers reduce their quantity demanded of higher price goods and substitute to 
purchasing lower price goods (therefore increasing quantity demanded of these goods). On 
average, this would translate to no effect on quantity demanded. For example, if consumers 
switch from a higher priced variety of household cleaner to a lower priced variety, this would 
appear on average as no change in quantity demanded across UPC. Or, if consumers decide not 
to purchase an expensive kitchen appliance and instead spend more of their budget on other 
lower priced items – they would have decreased quantity demanded in one UPC but increased 
demand for another. (3) Consumers only respond on the intensive margin, i.e. they stop 
purchasing any amount of the product online.  
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To distinguish between (1) and (2), we examine the effect of the VCA on quantity 
interacted with the average price of each UPC across purchases from all states in 2011, a year in 
which no state introduced a VCA. This price is by definition, unaffected by the VCA. In this 
way, we can examine heterogeneous effects on demand due to the VCA across high and low-
price commodities.  log Auhv = ij + i?ku ∗ NmT*uh ∗ Ny=zU{Vuhv + inku ∗ Ny=zU{Vuhv + i|ku∗ NmT*uh + oh + wx + pv + Zu + qehv (20) 
Now i? measures the average decrease in consumer demand across UPC, scaled by the price of 
each UPC. If consumers behave as described in (2), we would expect i? to be negative. On the 
other hand, if consumers behave as described in (1), we would expect i? to be zero.  
Effect of VCA on tax-exclusive prices. Table 3.3 decomposes the effect on total online 
expenditure into the effect on prices and quantity separately. We do this analysis at the purchase 
level including fixed effects for each UPC, time and household/county. Columns 3 – 6 shows the 
effect on log of prices. The coefficient of interest should be interpreted as the percent change in 
prices due to the VCA. We find that the VCA reduced prices by 0.9 percent, but this reduction is 
coming mostly from purchases of video products. We find no evidence of a statistically 
significant change in the tax-exclusive price of most goods purchased online, suggesting that any 
effective tax increase due to the VCA was fully passed through to consumers. Therefore, the 
reduction in expenditure is coming from consumers reducing quantity demanded of goods 
online.  
Quantity Purchased Online – Intensive Margin. Columns 1-3 in Table 3.3 show the effect 
of the VCA on the intensive margin of purchases. That is, conditional on observing a purchase of 
a particular UPC, how does quantity purchased of that UPC change as a result of the VCA? We 
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find no evidence of an intensive margin effect on quantity on average. That is, conditional on an 
online purchase, we do not see a decrease in quantity on average across all commodities. 
However, this result could be consistent with a decrease in quantity purchased of some goods 
and an increase in quantity purchased of others. For example, if consumers substituted away 
from a more expensive to a less expensive variety, we would not find evidence of a decrease in 
quantity on average.  
One way to test whether this happens would be to interact quantity effect with average 
pre-VCA price of each UPC. These results are presented in Table 3.4. We calculate the average 
price in 2011 for each UPC, a year in which there were no VCA adoptions, and interact the 
treatment effect with this price. Column 1 shows that quantity demanded decreases as a result of 
the VCA by more for higher price taxable goods, suggesting that consumers substitute away 
from higher price varieties to lower price varieties or lower price goods. A $1 increase in the 
average price of a UPC in 2011 translates to a 0.2 percentage point greater decrease in the 
quantity demanded of that UPC. This effect is robust to the inclusion of household fixed effects. 
For exempt goods, quantity demanded increases on average following the VCA but less so for 
higher price commodities. Overall, the VCA does not decrease quantity demanded of exempt 
goods on the intensive margin.  
 
3.6 VCA Effect on Tax Elasticities  
While the first empirical section evidenced the direct effects of the VCA on online 
purchasing, this second section will examine the effect of VCA adoption on fundamental 
parameters of the sales tax system: the elasticity of the tax base. We estimate the effect of the 
VCA on the “effective tax base”, which we define as the expenditure that is reported to the tax 
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authority. Prior to the VCA, this base is only expenditure at brick-and-mortar retailers. We 
assume that no online expenditure is reported, which we feel is reasonable given the near zero 
compliance rate on use taxes. After the VCA, the base is the sum of both online and offline 
expenditure.  
We also test the effect of the VCA on a subset of this base – expenditure on UPC that are 
purchased online between 5 and 95 percent of the time. Since the change in elasticity is expected 
to come from consumers who no longer purchase the good online in response to a tax change, we 
would expect that the effect is strongest on goods that can be purchased both online and at brick-
and-mortar retailers.  
 
3.6.1  VCA Effect on the Elasticity of the Tax Base with Respect to the Tax Rate 
The revenue consequence of an increase in the statutory tax rate are often divided into 
two countervailing effects:  the “arithmetic” effect of a higher rate which increases revenue, and 
the “economic effect” of reducing the base by dis-incentivizing the taxed economic activity (See, 
e.g. Laffer 2004 for discussion). We are concerned with the later. In our context, a higher sales 
tax rate increases the cost of taxed goods, and can reduce the sales tax base through multiple 
channels. The sales tax base can shrink in if taxpayers substitute to tax exempt products 
(substitution effect) or reduce consumption of all products (income effect), both of which are 
determined by consumers’ utility functions. In addition, the base might shrink if consumers 
respond to a higher tax rate by putting greater effort into sales tax avoidance via cross border 
shopping, black market purchases, or in the context at hand, by ordering items online. Unlike the 
substitution and income effects, the “avoidance effect” of increasing the tax rate on the tax base 
is determined by other features of the tax system, such as the enforcement regime, that determine 
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the effort/costs the taxpayer must expend/incur to avoid their jurisdiction’s tax rate. (See, e.g. 
Slemrod 2008).   
Let the sales tax base in jurisdiction of household h at time t be defined as  
Βg' = 	 V6g' ~ I6g' A6g'(V6g' ~ , ~W6  (21) 
where I is the set of all taxable goods in the jurisdiction of household h, and	~ is the sales tax 
rate. The first term, V6g' ~ , denotes the tax exclusive price; I6u' is the aggregate demand for 
product i in jurisdiction c at time t, and is a function of the tax inclusive price A6g' =V6g' ~ 1 + 	~ .  The effect of the VCA on tax rate elasticity of demand can be expressed as 			 ÄÅÇÉXÑ	Ö = ÄÅÇÖ ÉXÑÜ? − 		ÄÅÇÖ ÉXÑÜj ; the difference in the derivative of tax base with respect to 
the tax rate when a VCA is in place. 
We estimate this effect with the following OLS specification at the household-month 
level: á log =gue' = 	ij +	i?á~u' + in*y=à*eVmT*e' + i|á~u'*y=à*eVmT*e' + âIu' + og+ o' + oe ∗ * + qgue' (22) i? captures the relationship between the tax base and the sales tax rate in untreated states. in 
represents the tax rate invariant effect of VCA adoption on expenditures. The coefficient of 
interest, i| , captures how the effect of VCA adoption varies with changes in the sales tax rate.  Iu' is a vector of time-varying county-level controls, including the unemployment rate. 
Household and time fixed effects are included to control for any time-invariant household 
characteristics and time trends, respectively. 
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In Table 3.5, we estimate the above equation over three tax bases: first, the effective tax 
base, second the subset of the effective tax base that is purchased both online and offline, and 
finally, the brick-and-mortar tax base.  
Specifying at the household-month level has two advantages: we can include household 
effects which absorb idiosyncratic variation in expenditures within a household, thus making our 
estimates considerably more precise; and it further mitigates omitted variable concerns by 
partially controlling for endogenous sorting of households into local tax jurisdictions. After 
transformation, the coefficient estimate for i| in Col. 3 suggests that households’ taxed 
expenditures became somewhat less elastic to a tax rate change but that this change is not 
statistically significant. 
In column 1, we estimate the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate for all 
goods that are subject to the standard sales tax rate over all time periods. This base excludes 
goods like soda, alcohol or cigarettes and other goods that may be taxed at special rates. It also 
excludes goods that are tax exempt. We focus on only positive tax rate changes. We find a very 
large estimated elasticity of the tax base of -3.8, which is even larger when we restrict the sample 
to just prior to the VCA (and to states that adopt the VCA) at -4 (column 2). The coefficient on i| in column 4 is positive, as we expect, suggesting that the VCA reduced the elasticity of the 
effective base.  
In column 5, we estimate the same specification on the subset of goods that are purchased 
both online and offline. Surprisingly, we do not find the same effect of the VCA on this subset of 
goods. Columns 6 – 9 restrict the analysis to only brick-and-mortar purchases. The estimated 
effects are largely similar to what we see in the effects on the effective tax base. This is what we 
would expect since brick-and-mortar purchases form 99 percent of the effective base.  
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Although we control for hyper local market conditions, we recognize that our estimates 
may still be vulnerable to omitted variable bias. Future analysis will explore potential 
instruments for locality I’s tax rate, for example, the lagged tax rate of similar counties or 
proximate counties, or fixing price to some period before the treatment window (See Case, 
Rosen, Hines (1993); spatial correlation in tax rate paper estimated on UK data).  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
With the share of consumer purchases made online expected to grow, policymakers are 
understandably focused on ways of ensuring that online retailers remit sales taxes. In this paper, 
we study the impact of states adopting VCAs with Amazon, the largest online retailer, on the 
prices and purchases of online goods. We are also interested in the effect of VCA adoption, 
which makes it more difficult for consumers to purchase products online from non-remitting 
retailers, on the sales tax elasticity. To investigate these questions, we exploit variation in the 
location and timing of VCA adoption by states between 2010 and 2014, and we use data from the 
Nielsen Consumer Panel.  
First, we find that VCA adoption increases the share of online goods sold that are taxed at 
the point of sale. To establish this, we measure the percentage of taxable sales where the after-tax 
item price is equal to the pre-tax item price, implying that sales taxes were not being remitted by 
the online retailer. The proportion of online sales meeting this criterion falls by nearly half in 
response to the VCA, with the most pronounced changes at the largest retailers who are likeliest 
to comply; the analogous proportion for brick-and-mortar sales remains constant.  
Second, we find that consumers respond to VCA adoption by reducing their online 
consumption. On average, households in VCA-adopting states reduce online purchases by 8%, 
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similar to the findings of Baugh et al. that households reduce purchases on Amazon following 
VCA adoption by 9-12%. The discrepancy in these estimates is likely caused by the fact that, in 
our data, we capture all online expenditures, rather only those for Amazon, and many small 
retailers did not sign VCAs. This response suggests a sales tax elasticity of between -1.2 and -
1.4, smaller but still in the range of elasticity estimates reported by Baker and Keung in their 
study of consumer response to local sales tax rate changes. Both of these findings call into 
question the view that sales taxes are not salient to buyers at the point of purchase. 
Finally, we attempt to measure the impact of VCA adoption on the sales tax elasticity. 
Unfortunately, only two states in our sample change their tax rates after adopting a VCA, 
providing insufficient variation to reliably measure this estimate. In future work, we plan to use 
state sales tax holidays as an alternative source of tax rate variation to measure this impact. For 
example, if VCA adoption meaningfully limits consumers’ ability to avoid paying sales taxes 
throughout the year, then we would expect consumer response to sales tax holidays to increase. 
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Figure 3.1. Date of Implementation of Amazon VCAs 
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Figure 3.2. Fraction of Trips with Only Taxed Items that Paid No Sales Tax 
 
Notes: Observations are on(at) the state-month level, N=2080. Panel is unbalanced due to 
variation in treatment timing, which determines number of post treatment observation months. 
For computational reasons, this figure was generated on a random 10% sample of trips. 
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Figure 3.3. Change in Average Monthly Household Expenditure on Taxable Goods Online 
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Figure 3.4. Change in Average Monthly Household Expenditure on Taxable Goods Online at 
Large Retailers,  
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Figure 3.5. Change in Average Monthly Household Expenditure on Taxable Goods Online at 
Small Retailers 
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Figure 3.6. Change in Average Monthly Household Expenditure on Exempt Goods Online,  
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Figure 3.7. Change in Average Monthly Household Expenditure on Taxable Goods at Brick-and-
Mortar Stores 
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Figure 3.8. Local Sales Tax Rate Changes 
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Table 3.1. State and Local Sales Tax by Year 
 
  
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
State Rate Changes 3 3 0 8 0 14
County Rate Changes 68 59 65 92 88 372
City Rate Changes 207 247 1109 271 255 2089
Total 278 309 1174 371 343 2475
State and Local Sales Tax by Year
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Table 3.2. Effect of VCA on Change in Average Monthly Household Expenditure 
  
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Large Retail Small Retail
Treat X Post -0.231* -0.247*** 0.016 0.118 0.556 0.546
(0.119) (0.091) (0.103) (0.088) (0.677) (1.105)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3591230 3591230 3591230 3591230 3591230 3591230
Dependent Variable: Average Monthly Household Expenditure in Category
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.1. 
Dependent Variable is measured in dollars. Average online taxable expenditure per month 
is approximately $2.70 (of which $1.20 is at large retail),  average online exempt 
expenditure online is approximately $1.40. Online taxable expenditure declines by 8.5 
percent. Online taxable expenditure at large retailers declines by almost 20 percent. 
Online
Taxable
Brick-and-Mortar
Exempt Taxable Exempt
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Table 3.3. Pass-through of VCA to Prices, and Effect of VCA on Quantity Demanded 
Controlling for UPC-level Fixed Effects 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exempt Exempt
Treat X Post -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.009* -0.001 0.002
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
UPC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs (Purchases) 884647 778420 888773 879392 773596 885008
Dependent Variable: Log(Quantity)
Taxable
Dependent Variable: Log(Tax-Exclusive Price)
Taxable
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.1. Columns (2) and (5) 
exclude videos and CDs/ DVDs.  
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Table 3.4. Variation in Effect of VCA on Quantity Demanded by Ex-Ante Price of UPC 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exempt Products
Treat X Post X 2011 Price -0.001** -0.002** -0.001** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Treat X 2011 Price -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Treat X Post -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 0.007
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011)
UPC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes
Obs (Purchases) 884647 778420 769024 888773
Taxable Products
Dependent Variable: Log(Quantity)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.1. 2011 
price is the average price recorded for each UPC in 2011 across all purchases in the Nielsen 
Homescan data. Column (2) excludes video products. 
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Table 3.5. Effect of V
C
A
 on Elasticity of the Tax B
ase. 
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APPENDIX  
Measuring Tax-Exclusive and Tax-Inclusive Price in the Nielsen Data 
This appendix describes our investigation of Nielsen’s price data to determine the accuracy with 
which tax-exclusive and tax-inclusive prices are recorded. 
A.1 Are Nielsen’s Recorded Prices and Expenditure Tax-inclusive or Tax-exclusive?  
The distinction between tax-inclusive and tax-exclusive price is crucial for an analysis of 
incidence or other impacts of taxation. Nielsen does not explicitly request consumers to enter the 
tax-exclusive price. Two variables provide information on expenditure. One is the trip-level total 
expenditure, the other is item-level expenditure given separately for each item purchased in the 
trip. Nielsen’s documentation states that the trip-level total expenditure is tax inclusive but that 
the item-level expenditure is generally exclusive of tax. We test how often this is true by 
imputing our own measure of total trip-level tax inclusive expenditure from the item-level 
expenditure by adding up expenditure on each item, along with our measure of the applicable 
tax. If the item-level expenditure is always tax exclusive, and we are able to accurately impute 
the tax then the imputed measure of the trip-level expenditure should match the actual trip-level 
expenditure.  
In the Nielsen documentation, they specify a number of reasons the imputed trip-level 
expenditure might not equal the actual trip-level expenditure (“total spent”). These include the 
trip price is generally tax inclusive, whereas the item prices are not; not all items in the trip are 
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recorded by the panelist;12 not all items purchased by the panelist are tracked by Nielsen (only 
“fast moving” goods tracked);13 the scanner malfunctioned; and item price is censored (capped) 
at $999.99 for non-magnet items. 
A.2  Analysis of discrepancy: Predicted vs. Actual Tax-inclusive Expenditures 
Applicable tax rates on items are estimated using zip-code level information on local 
sales tax rate and the exemption status of products recorded in LexisNexis.14 Any errors in item-
level expenditure makes it more likely that there are discrepancies between imputed and actual 
trip-level expenditure in trips where more than one item was purchased, we separately analyze 
trips with one item versus multiple items (See Figure A.1 for the respective distributions of items 
per trip). 
We generate two measures of discrepancies in tax inclusive expenditure. First, we 
calculate the difference between the imputed trip-level expenditure and the actual trip-level 
expenditure (“tax discrepancy”). I plot the densities of this measure separately for online and 
brick-and-mortar purchases. For both markets, there are mass points at common sales tax rates, 
suggesting an error in correctly applying the tax rather than an error in item price recording (See 
Figure A.2).  
Next, because the imputed tax-inclusive expenditure may not have accurately assigned 
the tax rate, we restrict the sample to trips in which no exempt items were purchased and identify 
trips in this sample where imputed expenditure equals actual expenditure.  
																																																								
12 Nielsen Documentation, p66. “The panelist didn’t scan all products purchased. Some items never make it into the 
home to get scanned. Consider items purchased at a hardware store that might get stored in the garage rather than 
being brought into the home, or a candy bar that was purchased and eaten before the consumer got home.” 
13 Nielsen Documentation, p66. “Some items aren’t “coded” by Nielsen – Nielsen mostly tracks fast-moving 
consumer goods (e.g. not most apparel, electronics or home furnishings, etc.).” 
14 LexisNexis has the least intuitive interface in the history of search. Encyclopedia volumes are faster. 
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I collapse the total number of such purchases separately for online and BM retailers, from 
the trip level to the state – treatment month level (approximately 40 periods *50 states= 2080 
observations), and plot weighted kernel smoothers for online and BM separately relative to VCA 
passage (See Figure 3.2). As expected, the number of online purchases with no sales tax is much 
higher than for brick purchases in the pre-treatment period, and fall sharply after VCA passage. 
However, the drop in online purchases without sales tax belies a minimal change in the levels: up 
to 30 months after a VCA, approximately 1 out of 4 purchases are untaxed compared to 1 out of 
10 for brick purchases. 
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Figure A.1. Histogram of Number of Items Purchased per Trip 
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Figure A.2. Discrepancy between Computed and Observed Tax-inclusive Prices 
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